Copyright Law, the Production of Creative Works and Cultural
Growth in the Digital Age
Alina Ng
Table of Contents
Page
Abstract

1

Introduction

1

Part 1: The Traditional Flow of Information in the Copyright Industries

2

Part 2: Information Flow in the Copyright Industries in the Digital Age

14

Artists Recording Contract and the Sound Recordings Industry
The Recording Artists and New Technologies

28
34

Part 3: The Private Interest – Public Interest Balance

40

Part 4: The Private Interest – Public Interest Balance

56

Conclusion

65

Copyright Law, the Production of Creative Works and Cultural
Growth in the Digital Age
Alina Ng
Abstract
The Internet has affected information flow in copyrighted content in a profound manner. Authors
and artists are enabled through the Internet to assert greater control over the flow of information in their
works as these new technologies offer new and different distribution channels for content. These new
technologies also allow consumers to use content in ways, which had not been anticipated by the copyright
industries. This paper presents that copyright law was developed for a specific purpose, which was to
encourage learning and growth. As new technologies emerge and as content industries experience changes
in information flow in copyrighted works, copyright law had been used to maintain control over existing
information flows. The law has a pivotal role to play as the industries assert greater control over the flow
of information in content. The role of copyright law in this instance is not to maintain the existing status
quo as the industries undergo changes and loss of control over information flow in copyrighted works.
Rather, the law serves a more fundamental purpose of balancing information flow between private and
public interests. As the law was designed to encourage authors and artists to produce creative works for
the public purposes of education, socio-economic and cultural growth, copyright law in the global
information society plays an even more important role in ensuring that society has access to information in
copyrighted works.

Introduction
Attempts by the copyright industries to strengthen copyright protection may be
seen to be an effort to retain control of creative works and resist the freedom of
consumers to use creative works in new and innovative ways. In an unprecedented
fashion, consumers of creative works are today enabled through digital technologies as
well as the networked environment of cyberspace to share, exchange, modify and
transform an original copyrighted work in a manner, which print and analog technologies
did not permit before. Computing technologies have shifted the flow of creative
production and affected the traditional flow of information from the publisher of creative
content to the consumer. As the flow of information between publisher and consumer
changes courses to connect consumer to consumer and artists or authors to consumer in a
way that transcends jurisdictions and national boundaries, the copyright industries face
deep-rooted challenges in maintaining traditional methods of controlling the uses of
creative works. The profound changes brought about by enabling technologies present
difficult challenges to the copyright industries seeking to retain control of creative works
through an assertion of stronger copyrights because the emergence of an alternative
distribution channel for creative works through cyberspace empowers artists and authors
by directly connecting them with the consumers of their works and presenting producers
of creative works an option of bypassing their publishers. Consumers are also empowered
by digital technologies to use creative works for the production of other creative works
through modification and transformative uses, which content publishers are not able to
control.
This paper attempts to trace the traditional flow of content between publishers and
consumers of creative works and identify the changes brought about by digital
1

technologies and the networked environment of cyberspace to the copyright industries. It
is shown that print and analog technologies have allowed owners of creative works to
retain control of the flow of information to the consumer because the very nature of print
and analog technologies permit a consumer of creative works little or minimal
modification and alteration to creative works. Digital technologies however, present
opportunities to the consumer to change the flow of information by modifying and
altering creative works and redistributing those works through the Internet to other
consumers. This paper presents that digital technologies changes the flow of information
in creative content toward the consumer and allow the consumer of creative content to
use creative works in a manner, which previous technologies did not permit. As more
consumers become empowered by the use of digital technologies, it is envisaged that the
production of creative works for the progress of science and the useful arts will bring a
deeper meaning as cultural growth occurs through new and creative uses of existing
works. The paper proceeds to analyze the manner in which copyright law draws the
balance between public and private interests to ensure that creative works are available to
the public for developmental purposes as well as cultural growth and demonstrates how
digital technologies cultivates cultural growth through the use of creative works for
transformative purposes. This paper concludes by submitting that the doctrine of fair use
plays an even more significant role in the digital age to ensure that the proper balance
between public and private interests is achieved to encourage the production of creative
works and at the same time protect the constitutional right of access to creative works for
the progress of science and the useful arts.
Part 1: The Traditional Flow of Information in the Copyright Industries
For most of copyright law’s history, the law developed and grew around
technologies, which were built on an analog platform, which allowed content owners to
control the flow, dissemination and use of information in content. Analog platform
technologies, while allowing works to be reproduced and distributed to a wide segment of
the public, nonetheless allowed copyright owners to keep a better grasp on the
reproduction and distribution of their works “with the relative ease of detecting
unauthorized commercial-scale publication.”1 Analog technologies did not provide the
much more “versatile, although more porous, platform for storing, distributing and
reproducing works of authorship,”2 which digital technologies today provide the content
industries, offering new opportunities to commercialize creative works and build new
markets through the Internet and at the same time changing the course of information
flow between content owner and consumer. Traditionally, print and analog technologies
had by their very nature vested control of the flow of information with the publisher or
printer of content. The interests of the author and the consumer of creative works were
1

Analog platforms ““fix” works of authorship through some human or mechanical process of deforming a
physical object (such as stone, paper, vinyl, film) in a manner that conveys an image (a letter, number, or
graphic image) or signal varying in audio frequency (sound) or light or color intensity (film). The term
“analog” is used to signify that the medium uses an “analogy” to represent the phenomenon.” Peter S.
Menell, Can Our Current Conception of Copyright Law Survive the Internet Age?: Envisioning Copyright
Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 104-105 (2002)
2
See id. at 105
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largely ancillary to the primary interests of copyright owners,3 which were printers and
publishers, who owned the right to publish a manuscript or a piece of work and recover
profits from the printing and publishing of creative works. This monopoly over the right
to publish had effectively allowed printers and publishers in traditional copyright
industries to control the course of information flow in creative works.
The initial conception of copyright as a right of a publisher or printer to publish
literary works4 did not perceive of the right of the author in the work5 nor of the public’s
right of access to the work. The right to retain control over creative works and as a result,
the course of information flow from the printer or publisher to the consumer of literary
works, began as a tool to regulate the conduct of trade within the print industry.
Copyright, in the form of a publisher’s right to make copies of books,6 began in 16th
century England7 as a loose set of rules that were governed by guild ordinances and acts
of censorship.8 The right, largely a tool for trade regulation9 had been developed by the
earliest London publishers as a form of business practice and was granted by the
publishers’ guild, a medieval association of book publishers known as the Stationers’
3

Copyright, as was originally conceived, did not encompass the rights of authors or users of copyrighted
works. It is said that the “[r]ight of copy was the stationer’s [the printer or publisher] not the author’s.”
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 5 (Columbia University Press 1967)
4
L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 20 (University of Georgia
Press 1991)
5
It is said that “any prevailing notions of piracy or plagiarism” … “would have been viewed with printer’s
or publisher’s not author’s eyes. And while there was an idea of piracy of content which might reach
beyond verbatim copying, we should not suppose that any abstruse or refined ideas of literary theft could
have been entertained. Right of copy was the stationer’s not the author’s. Living authors furnished some of
the materials for the printing mills, and increasingly these manuscripts had to be purchased in a business
way (usually payment was made in a lump sum).” See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF
COPYRIGHT 5 (Columbia University Press 1967). Author’s rights in literary works arose formally in the
decision of Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303; 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769), which is said to have “marked the
great transition of legal thought to analyzing copyright as a right of the author” as the analysis in the case
focused on whether the author had a property right in literary works arising from the very creation of the
work. Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of
Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1153 (1983)
6
Prior to the introduction of the printing press in England, publishers together with “scribes, booksellers
and bookbinders” had already organized themselves within the book trade to form the Stationers’
Company, which became a “closely knit, powerful cartel with a single object – maintaining order and
profits in the publishing trade.” Only members of the Stationers’ Company were entitled to print books.
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 41 (Hill and Wang 1994)
7
A royal printer was appointed in England in 1504 and the first printing privilege was issued in 1518 to his
successor Richard Pynson. The first printing privilege was issued “in the form of a prohibition for two
years of the printing by any other person of a certain speech to which this first English copyright notice was
appended.” It is also stated that “Bishop Fell, in his memoirs on the state of printing in the University of
Oxford, states that this University had been granted certain exclusive privileges of transcribing and
multiplying books by means of writing; and Lowndes in his early “Historical sketch of the law of
copyright,” published in 1840 and 1842, cites many early privileges, most commonly for seven years,
granted after the invention of printing.” RICHARD ROGERS BOWKER, COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND LAW 19
(Houghton Mifflin Company 1912)
8
The “stationer’s copyright” it is said, “existed for over a hundred and fifty years regulated not only by the
common-law, but by guild ordinances and acts of censorship.” LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 9 (Vanderbilt University Press 1968)
9
See id. at 11
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Company.10 Primarily being a right to publish a work and nothing more,11 the right was
one that belonged to the London book publishers, which were members of the Stationers’
Company, and any disputes about copyright ownership were resolved within the
governing body of the Stationers’ Company known as the Court of Assistance.12 As
copyright was introduced as a way to conduct the early book publishing business in
London, copyright as it was conceived then is said to not have any theoretical
justification or jurisprudential basis.13
The introduction of a new technology, the printing press, however, resulted in the
formalization of copyright into a formal set of rules to protect literary works. Most
academic literature earmark the introduction of the printing press as the impetus for
formalizing copyright into an established set of rules14 because the technology provided
the “first realistic opportunity for authors to recognize the potential economic benefit
from their work.”15 Copyright and technological developments are inextricably
entwined. The development of a new technology in the form of the printing presses that
allowed the making of copies of literary works resulted in the emergence of copyright as
a tool for controlling the production of creative works.16 The Supreme Court recognized
this dynamic relationship between the law and technology in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.17 when the Court commented that “from its beginning the
law of copyright has developed as a response to significant changes in technology.
Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying equipment – the printing press –
that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection.”18 When copies of literary
works were made by hand writing a manuscript all over again before the introduction of
10

The rights assumed by the Stationers’ Company “were not copyrights in the modern sense – the right to
reproduce intangible intellectual creations – but rather rights in “copies,” the physical product, regardless of
whether the work of authorship was ancient or contemporary.” WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE 8 (The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1994)
11
It is said that “copyright was born of a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade others from reprinting a
book” and “[i]t did not go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how a work
could be used.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 87 (The Penguin Press 2004)
12
LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 9 (Vanderbilt University Press 1968)
13
It is said that “[a]ny attempt to state the precise nature of the stationer’s copyright calls for a word of
caution. Since businessmen developed and shaped it to their own ends, there was little or no regard for
underlying principles or a sound theoretical basis for copyright.” See id. at 9
14
It is said that “the printing presses, with its ability to make multiple copies of a work easily, is frequently
cited as the impetus for efforts to secure a more formal type of protection for books.” WILLIAM F. PATRY,
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1994)
15
Russ VerSteeg, The Roman Law Roots of Copyright, 59 MD. L. REV. 522, 525 (2000)
16
The effect of copying a literary work without the permission of the author is aptly explained by
Augustine Birrell, when he referring to the “art of printing,” states that “[i]f the author had a private
printing press he could publish an edition for himself, but, as this is unusual, he employs and pays a printer
and a bookseller. The edition is circulated, and each buyer of a copy becomes the owner of a copy of a
book which is his to read and to lend, to sell, or to leave to his heirs. But every copy supposes an original
which subsists somewhere in splendid isolation, whatever may be the number of the copies, and were the
purchaser of a single copy to reproduce other copies from it he would thereby wholly or in part destroy the
value of the property still in the hands of the owner of the original. To do this would be a wrongful act, and
is usually so regarded whilst the author lives.” AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, THE LAW AND HISTORY OF
COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 15-16 (Cassell and Company, Limited 1899)
17
464 U.S. 417 (1983)
18
464 U.S. at 430
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the printing presses, piracy of literary works was not a perceived threat to authors of
literary works as the reproduction of a manuscript by hand was a task that was both
laborious and time consuming to scribes of the work.19 As the making of another copy of
a manuscript took such a long time, the distribution of copies of manuscripts did not
reach very far and hence did not threaten the livelihood of an author of literary works.
The introduction of a new technology that allowed for the reproduction of literary works
on a massive scale, the printing press, by William Caxton in Westminster in 1476,
changed this idyllic literary setting by allowing copies of literary works to be
technologically reproduced.20
The Government of England received the printing press with mixed feelings.21
The print technology gave rise to the print industry, which was a new industry to be
encouraged. Yet print technology facilitated the reproduction and distribution of
materials, which may have been detrimental to Government interests. As the British
Crown took “an acute interest in this dangerous art”22 of print technology as it was
introduced23 and began to “assert prerogative rights regarding it.”24 The Crown did this
by setting up a Royal Printer in 1485 and granting royal privileges and printing patents on
the exclusive right to print particular books from 1518 onwards.25 With the enactment of
the Act of Supremacy, which declared Henry VIII to be the “Supreme Head of the
Church of England,” in 1534, England became separated from the Roman Catholic
Church and the “ferment occasioned by the separation”26 resulted in “continual unrest in
England,”27 thus making “censorship and press control perennial policies of the Tudor
19

It is explained that “[i]n ancient times, writings were made on clay tablets, stone, metal plates, wood,
papyrus, animal skins and parchment. Suitable materials were often expensive and scarce, and writing on
these materials could be difficult and time consuming. Transporting and preserving these writings would
also be difficult. Under these conditions, the logistics of copying writings served as barriers to large scale
copying and distribution of writings.” Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law:
Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 377-378 (2004)
20
“The moveable type printing presses,” it is said, “facilitated efficient, mass duplication of a single
manuscript. The importance of the printing press can hardly be overstated. With multiple copies and
decreased costs associated with printing, literature became more accessible. Printing also doubtlessly saved
many works from extinction. Printing not only made possible the mass production of books, but also
assured their accuracy.” See id. at 378
21
“The introduction of the printing press into England,” it has been said, “meant for the Government at first
a new trade to be encouraged, and then an instrument to be controlled.” See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON,
COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 21 (Vanderbilt University Press 1968)
22
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 3 (Columbia University Press 1967)
23
The introduction of the printing presses that allowed printers to produce large number of copies relatively
quickly and inexpensively led to the development of a “potentially large, new market of readers” as well as
the “need to protect authors and publishers/booksellers from pirates bent on stealing that new market.”
WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 6 (The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1994)
24
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 3 (Columbia University Press 1967)
25
It is explained that “[t]he uncontrolled dissemination of literary works and political treatises could invite
sedition; also, printing, along with other emerging industries, gave the Crown a new source of revenue and
favors. By granting an exclusive right – a patent, it was called – to print particular literary or legal or
educational works to a given bookseller, the English sovereigns were able to tap into a continuing stream of
loyalty and income.” PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 40 (Hill and Wang 1994)
26
LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 21 (Vanderbilt University Press
1968)
27
See id. at 21
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and Stuart sovereigns.”28 Censorship and press control were achieved through the official
licensing for the printing of books. In 1557, under the reign of Queen Mary, the
Stationers’ Company was chartered to become the official guardian of royal censorship
and was granted the exclusive right to print literary works. The “entire formative period
of early copyright”29 occurred in this period when censorship was regarded as a major
policy of the English sovereign during a period of religious and political ferment. With
the charter granted to the London stationers, printers and publishers obtained with the
charter, a “national monopoly”30 to print literary works and the freedom to create rights,
which pertained to the ownership of copies of books that eventually developed into
copyright. As a result of this, copyright is usually reckoned to be a publisher’s right in the
first place.31 By the grant of exclusive printing rights to the Stationers’ Company, the
Company was allowed a great degree of monopolistic control over the English book
publishing trade and had largely used copyright as a mechanism to further their economic
interest in the industry.
As the Stationers’ Company asserted rights over the book trade, publishers and
printers of literary works had in their possession, a very effective means of controlling
information flow in literary works.32 Copyright gave the Stationers’ Company an absolute
right to print and publish books.33 This right was a right that existed in perpetuity34 and
“passed on from one generation of printers to the next.”35 Through this right, members of
the Stationers’ Company controlled the flow of information by retaining exclusive
control of the right to print and publish literary works. Authors of literary works were
given little recognition in the book trade and as result, could not assert any rights over
their works or control the flow of information.36 An author’s manuscript was sold to
28

See id. at 21
See id. at 21
30
See id. at 21
31
It is explained that “[t]he stationers were businessmen who manufactured and sold books, and to them
press control was a means to their own ends – government protection of their market monopoly. As Edward
Arber, commenting on “the virulence of their trade competition,” has said: “We must think of these printers
and publishers as caring chiefly for their crowns, half-shillings and silver pennies. They bore the yoke of
[governmental] licensing as best they could, but only as a means to hold themselves harmless from the
political and ecclesiastical powers. Their business was to live and make money; and keen enough they were
about it.” These were the men who created the stationer’s copyright – the first English copyright, and thus
(by way of an indisputable series of casually related events) the direct antecedent of modern American
copyright. That copyright in the beginning was a publisher’s right is hardly surprising; indeed, it is
remarkable that later it somehow came to be known as an author’s right.” L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY
W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 20 (University of Georgia Press 1981)
32
It has been said that “[i]n the sixteenth century, no agency for controlling property was more vigorous
than the Stationers’ Company; and in practical effect on copyright, none was more powerful.” HARRY
RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE 29 (University of Texas Press 1956)
33
The Stationers’ Company was regarded to be the “immediate source of the authority to print, bind and
sell books.” PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 41 (Hill and Wang 1994)
34
The rights that the stationers had could be transferred by “sale, gift or inheritance.” It is further said that
“these private copyrights were of unlimited duration.” Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and
Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 397398 (2004)
35
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 41 (Hill and Wang 1994)
36
Until the Statute of Anne 1710, codifying copyright into law, “the author’s legal significance was not
written into law” and the “social and psychological attitudes of authors toward the significance of their own
29
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printers and publishers and with the sale of the manuscript, an author also sold the
exclusive right to print and publish the book.37 The Stationers’ Company retained the
status quo and control over the book trade through continuous lobbying for censorship
laws38 to support their continuous monopoly over the print business by arguing that
censorship was necessary to maintain order within the book trade,39 an argument, which
found favor with the English Crown40 at a time when the Government was concerned
with press regulation to curb the publication of heresies and seditious materials and
maintain social order.41
The Stationers’ Company began to lose control over the book trade with the lapse
and non renewal of the last censorship law, the Licensing Act 1662 in 1694.42 As the
work and toward the ownership of literary composition” were not entirely clear. Writers such as John
Milton, whose eloquence in the Areopagitica called for the protection of literary works from unauthorized
copying, defended the booksellers’ copyright and not authors’ rights. HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST
COPYRIGHT STATUTE 11 (University of Texas Press 1956)
37
It is explained that “living authors furnished some of the material for the printing mills, and increasingly
these manuscript had to be purchased in a business way (usually payment was made in a lump sum); but
upon entry the author dropped away and it was the stationer who had the right of multiplication of copies
against others of the Company, which is to say, speaking imprecisely, against all those eligible to print.”
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 5 (Columbia University Press 1967)
38
As the stationer’s copyright existed together with censorship laws, in the 16th and early 17th centuries, the
Company exercised its powers with the assistance of the Star Chamber Courts that were charged with the
enforcement of censorship laws. Decrees from the Star Chamber courts enjoyed the force of law and by the
Star Chamber decrees of 1586 and 1637, the Company’s powers were affirmed and the registration of
works in the Company’s books before publication became a requirement for copyright protection. As a
result, the Company, with the assistance of the Star Chamber courts, managed to assert control over the
book trade and the Government with the help of the Company, censored the press and limited the
dissemination of objectionable materials. Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright
Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 398-399 (2004)
39
It is stated that “[t]he stationers early perceived the value of censorship regulations to support their
monopoly, and they never lost sight of that point. Indeed, their continual lobbying was such that the longcontinued existence of censorship in England can be attributed in large measure to them, although they
were not always successful in their efforts.” LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 115 (Vanderbilt University Press 1968)
40
In 1559, Queen Elizabeth confirmed the Company’s charter. It is said that the Queen knew “that
conditions of the Company’s operation were ideally suited to growth and expansion, and useful for
guarding interests of the Crown. Behind the Company was an old tradition; sustaining it was a strong
monarchy; directing its fortunes were good businessmen. The press regulation conducted by the Stationers
was naturally inseparable from copyright, for copyright was inseparable from the Company’s interests.”
HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE 36-37 (University of Texas Press 1956)
40
LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 114 (Vanderbilt University Press
1968)
41
It is said that “[i]n considering the origins of copyright, two things must never be forgotten. First, the
Church and her priesthood, frightened – and who dare say unreasonably frightened? – at the New Learning,
and at the independence and lawlessness of mind and enthusiasm that accompanied the New Learning; and
second, the guilds or trade unions; jealous of their privileges, ever at war one with another, and making
their appeal to the Crown for protection against outside interference with their strictly defined domains of
business.” AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 49 (Cassell and
Company, Limited 1899)
42
Parliament’s House of Commons rejected a renewal of the Licensing Act 1662 and provided its reasons
in an elaborate argument that is believed to have been drafted by John Locke. According to the House of
Commons, “the illegality of Stationers’ monopolies, the lack of point and definiteness of the regulations
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Stationers’ Company began to lose control over the book trade, the assertion of author’s
property rights in literary works became a viable strategy that the stationers adopted to
maintain their monopoly power. Although there were no statutory or judicial recognition
of an author’s property rights in literary works prior to the Statute of Anne 1710, authors
such as Daniel Defoe, had set the stage upon which the stationers may present their
arguments for authorship rights.43 As the Government’s policy for censorship and press
control slowly dwindled, the stationers lost their primary tool for maintaining order
within the book trade.44 On February 26, 1706, the stationers submitted a new law to
Parliament for a bill to secure property in books and did not base their arguments on the
revival of licensing or censorship.45 Rather, the stationers argued that the disorder in the
book trade was a discouragement to authors from writing books that were of public
benefit.46 The resulting statute, The Statute of Anne 1710, embodied much of the
arguments surrounding the passing of the bill and introduced two concepts that were not
originally part of the stationer’s copyright, but which are pivotal to the present copyright
regime in the United States.
The Statute of Anne 1710 introduced first, a statutory limitation to the perpetual
right of the booksellers to break the control that the booksellers had over the print
industry.47 This statutory limitation on the perpetual right to copy had the effect of
limiting the power that the Stationers’ Company held over the book trade48 since its
and the improbability of successful prosecution of breaches of printing restrictions in courts of common
law,” were sufficient reasons to reject the renewal of the Licensing Act. HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST
COPYRIGHT STATUTE 89 (University of Texas Press 1956)
43
Defoe had opposed the institution of licensing and had acknowledged that the recognition of authorial
property in literary works through an Act of Parliament would restrain the licentiousness of the press and
put an end to piracy. MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS 34-35 (Harvard University Press 1993)
44
It is said that after the expiration of the Licensing Act 1664, “[l]icensing, regulation of copy and other
Parliamentary restriction of the press which had characterized the mid-seventeenth century were now things
of the past. Attempts to establish a new press regulation act in 1698 failed, and from that time until 1710,
no suggestion for regulation of trade was put into practical effect.” HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT
STATUTE 89 (University of Texas Press 1956)
45
LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 142 (Vanderbilt University Press
1968)
46
The position taken by the stationers is aptly explained when it is stated that “[t]he stationers made the
case that they could not produce the fragile commodities called books, and thus encourage learned men to
write them, without protection against piracy; but no one, we can be sure, deliberated what strange results
might follow if the same logic were applied to other fragile ventures outside the book field. It is hard to
know how far the interests of authors were considered in distinction from those of publishers.” BENJAMIN
KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 7-8 (Columbia University Press 1967)
47
The Statute provided for the statutory limitation by making a distinction between old books and new
books. For old books, the Statute provided authors, who had printed but not yet transferred their rights and
booksellers and others who had purchased the copy of any book to print them, a twenty-one year term
protection from April 10, 1710. For new books, the Statute provided authors with the exclusive right to
print the book for a fourteen year period and if the author is still alive after the fourteen year period, they
would have the same right for another fourteen year period. AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, THE LAW AND HISTORY
OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 94-95 (Cassell and Company, Limited 1899)
48
It is said that the “Stationers’ Company ended up getting far less than it had petitioned for because
Parliament, instead of recognizing perpetual rights, passed a law limiting the exclusive right of publication
to a set term of years and containing other provisions limiting power previously enjoyed by the Stationers.”
WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 11 (The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1994)

8

formation in 1557.49 After the expiration of the copyright, the work will fall into the
public domain50 to ultimately serve the public interest of learning, education and
development.51 In light of the history that led to the passing of the Statute, it does appear
that Parliament had intended to transform the stationer’s copyright, which was originally
a device for censorship and an instrument to maintain the stationer’s monopoly, into a
law that may serve to destroy the booksellers’ monopoly by providing for a limited
copyright protection term, making copyright available to anyone and introducing price
control provisions, which were created in response to the high prices that the booksellers
had charged for the sales of their books.52 As a curtailment on the stationer’s perpetual
monopoly over the book trade, the Statute of Anne had also introduced the pubic domain,
in which copyrighted works were to eventually rest after their copyright had expired.
Prior to the Statute of Anne, all literature belonged to the bookseller in perpetuity and
could only be printed if the strict standards of censorship were met.53 The exclusive
implementation of the stationer’s copyright had been outside the purview of the courts
and was only subject to self-regulation within the Stationers’ Company.54 With the
Statute of Anne, however, copyright was only granted to a new work, had a limited
duration of protection to a maximum duration of 28 years (a 14 year term, which is
renewable for another 14 years), and encompassed only the right to print, publish and
vend, thus creating a public domain that was not within the exclusive control of the
Stationers’ Company.55
The Statute of Anne 1710 introduced second, the author as a legitimate right
holder to break the monopoly, which the booksellers had over the print industry. The
recognition of the author has today allowed creative content producers to assert very
strong rights over the uses of their creative works as well as the flow of information in
copyrighted works in the digital world. The control, which creative content producers
49

It is explained that “[e]ven before the printing press, craftsmen involved in the bookmaking and
bookselling trades organized in England to protect their interests. In 1357, there was a craft guild for
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have over copyrighted materials today, is one of the more significant driving forces
shaping the role of copyright law in the digital age. This is so even though the inclusion
of the author as a legitimate copyright holder under the Statute of Anne 171056 is said to
be “more a matter of form than of substance”57 because “the monopolies at which the
statute was aimed were too long established to be attacked without some basis for
change”58 and “the most logical and natural basis for the changes was the author.”59 It is
noted that the benefit of the Statute to authors is really minimal and only protected
authors in so far as they were being remunerated for their work since authors would have
to assign their copyright to a stationer in order to be paid.60 As the introduction of
authors’ rights in the Statute of Anne 1710 was more of a solution to address the growing
monopolistic control that the stationers had over the book trade rather than an overt
statutory recognition of rights that authors ought to have in their creative works,61 the
Statute ought not to be regarded as settling “the theoretical questions behind the notion of
literary property.”62 The Statute, nonetheless, did “represent a significant moment in a
process of cultural transformation.”63 Following a period in which “censorship and
copyright were deeply intertwined,”64 it is said “the passage of the statute marked the
divorce of copyright from censorship and the reestablishment of copyright under the
rubric of property rather than regulation.”65 It is through the provision of property rights
in creative works, which allow authors to assert control over uses of their works for
further developmental and transformative uses.
The Statute of Anne carries some important aspect of copyright law into the
present. The Statute of Anne was the first law, which provided for a limited right over
printed books for the encouragement of learning. By recognizing the potential for
oppressive monopolies to emerge from the grant of a perpetual right in printed books,
56
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Parliament introduced a limitation to the copyright term to put a curb on the existence of
the stationer’s copyright in perpetuity.66 The expiration of the copyright term would
allow the work to fall into the public domain and enable the greater public to access the
work, and hence to encourage learning, education and development. In its attempt to
regulate the print business and restore order to the trade, the Statute of Anne had also
recognized that authors had rights in their work, which although assignable to a printer,
were nevertheless rights that belonged to authors, granting to authors a legal standing to
pursue their rights in a court of law as proprietors of their rights. The introduction of the
author into the book-publishing scene removed the law of copyright completely from the
previous realm of censorship and licensing, which had given rise to the stationer’s
monopoly in the 16th century. In this sense, the notion of proprietary authorship put an
end to the censorship and licensing regime that the English Parliament sought to end with
the expiration of the Licensing Act 1662 in 1694.
The early control over the book publishing trade by the Stationers’ Company had
allowed booksellers in England to control the flow of information in literary works by
limiting and keeping an account of printers and publishers, which were allowed to print
and publish books.67 By keeping the right to print and publish exclusively to members of
the Stationers’ Company, the Company was able to exert a monopolistic control over the
book printing and publishing trade,68 thereby preventing the unauthorized printing and
publication of literary works and restraining the flow of information69 towards individual
readers, who purchase their books.70 The passing of the Statute of Anne 1710 however,
created a larger purpose for the grant of copyrights in books and acknowledged a more
66

By imposing a time limitation upon copyright, there would be an increase in competition within the book
trade as valuable books would become available to any publisher for publication after the expiration of the
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fundamental reason for protecting literary works, which is to encourage learning and
education. The recognition that literary works and creative products are important to
generate a society’s interest in learning, growth and development produces a freer flow of
information towards the public domain or society in general, who have become the
primary beneficiaries of the limitations to perpetual copyright under the Statute of Anne
1710.71 As society became recognized as having a right to access creative works for
learning and education, the flow of information in literary works became freer as works,
which fell into the public domain were creatively used to reproduce new and different
works of authorship.72 The Disney cartoon stories, for example, are taken from the public
domain works of the Grimm Brothers and other content, which existed in the culture at
that time.73 Indeed the monopolistic control of the Stationers’ Company over the book
trade, which led up to Parliament’s enactment of the Statute of Anne 1710 to curb the
stationer’s monopolistic practices, gave Congress sufficient guidance in limiting the
duration of copyright protection under the Constitution.74
71
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When the United States was founded as a new nation, copyright was rapidly
adopted in the country and authors’ rights became the basis for the American copyright
system.75 Early American copyright embodies four basic ideas, which are copyright as
protecting the author’s rights, promoting learning, providing order in the book trade as a
government grant and preventing harmful monopolies.76 These ideas have been embodied
within the United States’ copyright regime on several levels. The protection of author’s
rights, for example, is central to the state statutes. The Constitutional clause, as another
example, embodies the idea that copyright law is to promote learning in the interest of the
general public.77 The development of early copyright in the United States differed from
that in England in several ways. In the United States, authors and not the booksellers led
the drive for copyright. As a result, no institution in the United States ever came close to
having the monopolistic control that the Stationers’ Company had over the book trade in
England. The earliest controversy in the United States was one between national and
local powers and not one “between London monopolists and provincial pirates.”78
The primary purpose for federal copyright protection in the United States is stated
in the Constitution. The Constitutional clause provides Congress with the power “to
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”79 Three policies for protecting creative works may be ascertained from the
Constitutional clause, which are to promote learning, preserve the public domain and
benefit the author, whose creative endeavors ought to be rewarded in order that the public
has sufficient creative materials to learn from and build upon.80 The first federal law
passed under the Constitutional clause was the Copyright Act 1790, which was entitled
“An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and
books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.”
Section 1 of the Act provided for two forms of copyrights, which are copyrights for
maps, charts and books already printed in the United States and for maps, books and
charts to be printed or published. Section 2 protects printed works from piracy, which
may be committed by printing, reprinting or publishing a copyrighted work, importing
copies of copyrighted works or selling a work which infringed a copyright, with the
knowledge that the work was an infringing copy. It is said that “the rights under
copyright granted by the statute were not essentially different from those under the
stationer’s copyright, except of course, for the limited term.”81 Functionally, American
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copyright was thought to be “a right to which a given work was subject”82 but because
copyright was introduced as an author’s right in the United States and was granted by
statute, the right became “the exclusive source of the author’s protection after
publication.”83
The introduction of the author as a right holder in creative works and the public as
the beneficiary of works produced under copyright law has changed the flow of
information from the author of creative works towards the public in general. The flow of
information between the publisher of creative works and the individual user, who
purchases a copy of the work, still exists. However, as new technologies emerge,
connecting authors to the users of their works, allowing new uses of creative works and
encouraging public access to these works, the flow of information in creative works is
radically altered. Information in creative works through digital technologies on the
Internet flow from an author and reaches countless users. Through digital technologies on
the Internet, users may also send creative works to each other thereby creating a stream of
information flow among users. With the introduction of the author and the public domain
as legitimate interest holders in the law of copyright, the traditional flow of information
in copyrighted works between the publisher and the purchaser of the work extended to
include flows of information between the producer of creative works and the general
public, who are to benefit from the author’s creative endeavors. This flow of information
in copyrighted works is further increased with the emergence of digital media
technologies, which make the storage, reproduction and distribution of content easier.
Part 2 of this paper explores these changes to information flow in copyrighted content as
a result of digital technologies.
Part 2: Information Flow in the Copyright Industries in the Digital Age
Technology has a unique way of changing the control that a copyright owner has
over the work. “Digital technology” has “changed the marketplace”84 by allowing
ordinary users to make copies of creative works and distribute those works to the general
public. It is indeed a “cliché that digital technology permits everyone to become a
publisher”85 but the effect of the Internet and digital technologies on the copyright
industries is a profound one because basic distribution channels for creative works, which
have worked well for a long time, change as the number of users, who are able to access
works, increase on a global scale as a result of the Internet. The change in information
flow and loss of control over the use of creative works has caused the industries to assert
their ownership in copyrighted works. In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,86 the
motion pictures industry sought to retain control over their copyrighted works by
restraining the distribution of a computer program called the DeCSS87 through the
82
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Internet. The industry brought an action under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act88 to
prevent the Internet distribution of the program, which sole purpose is to allow users to
decrypt the encryption code employed by the motion pictures industry in their DVDs.
The United States District Court for the S.D. of New York decided that in this case, the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act would apply to prevent the distribution of the DeCSS
through the Internet.89 The sound recording industry’s reaction to the Napster service is
also another example of the industry’s assertion of greater control over their copyrights as
the Internet and digital technologies allow music files to be shared through peer-to-peer
networks and downloaded through the Internet. The millions of music copies, which were
downloaded and distributed through the Internet, caused the industry to lose control over
their music and the manner in which music had traditionally been sold to the consumer.90
As new technologies emerge to allow copyrighted works to be used and distributed in a
manner not anticipated by the industries, the industries have always relied on their
copyrights to regain control over information flow in copyrighted works.
This relationship between copyright law and technology is a vibrant one and has
existed throughout the history of copyright law.91 The effect of technology on the flow of
information in the copyright industries became apparent when copyright holders and
technology developers realized that digital technologies running on the Internet allow for
the reproduction and distribution of content in a manner that is not confined by the
physical parameters that were previously set by analog technology.92 As digital
form. These DVDs may only be viewed on players and computer drives that are equipped with licensed
technology that permits the devices to decrypt and play the films. See id. at 3003
88
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technologies increase public access to creative works and as the industry loses control
over the public’s uses of these works, copyright law’s role in ensuring continuous control
over information flow is questioned.93 The introduction of new technologies into the
marketplace has the effect of causing industries to adapt and change as they respond to
the new technology.94 The advent of the Internet and related digital technologies, such as
video streaming technologies,95 peer-to-peer file sharing software96 and portable digital
audio technologies97 have cumulatively caused an “industrial revolution”98 within the
copyright industries, in particular, the sound recording industry. These changes, which
are brought about by new technologies, disrupt conventional business models and
industrial structures that have allowed content to be successfully commercialized thus far.
such constraints and, defined by its characteristic of allowing content to be “inexpensively, quickly and
flawlessly reproduced and distributed widely with relatively little risk of detection,” the digital platform
allows users of copyrighted works to do what used to be impossible on prior technological platforms. See
id. at 164
93
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It appears a natural response for copyright industries to assert more control over business
models that have been successful in the past.
The move to control new uses of existing content through copyright law has been
successful in some cases. When the motion pictures industry began producing movies for
the general public, there was a need for ideas to inspire the production of motion pictures.
The industry began to produce motion pictures based on existing works without prior
consent from copyright owners. In Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros.,99 the Kalem Company
hired a writer to read General Lew Wallace’s novel, Ben Hur, and write a scenario for a
motion picture, which it then produced without securing a copyright license100 for the
production of a motion picture. In this case, the Supreme Court had to decide if the public
exhibition of the motion picture was a dramatization of Ben Hur and an infringement of
copyright in the novel. Justice Holmes, in delivering the decision of the Court, held that
moving pictures can be used to dramatize a novel and when that is done, as in this case,
there is an infringement of the right, which the statute reserves.101 Relying on the case of
Daly v. Palmer,102 wherein the Circuit Court S.D. New York held that an author’s
depiction of a “rail road” scene in a dramatic composition or play was protected by
copyright law, Justice Holmes gave a broad construction103 to the meaning of
dramatization of a work under the Copyright Act 1891. With cognizance for the fact that
the motion picture was an exploitation of the novel using a film technology that was new
at that time, Justice Holmes acknowledged that the dramatization of a novel need not
necessarily be done by speech and may be instead be achieved by action, when in his
judgment he says, “[a]ction can tell a story, display the most vivid relations between men,
and depict every kind of human emotion, without the aid of a word. It would be
impossible to deny the title of drama to pantomime as played by masters of the art”.104
The implication of the case of Kalem Company v. Harper Brothers is that
theatrical exhibitions of film have now fallen under the purview of copyright law.
Arguably, by bringing motion pictures within the scope of the Copyright Act as a form of
99
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expression that infringes upon an author’s copyright, Justice Holmes had allowed a new
technology, the motion pictures production technology, which allows for new forms of
exploitation of an existing literary work, to fall within copyright’s control. There may be
justification for Justice Holmes’s decision on the premise that an economically important
medium had then emerged for the expression of creative works – the theatrical exhibition
of films. Together with other factors such as a “narrow statutory phrase” under the
copyright law, a “hesitant Congress” to react to the changing technological environment
and Justice Holmes’s intent on “building a bridge between copyright and popular
culture,”105 this case was decided in favor of the plaintiff for more extensive copyright
protection. The copyright scope was also extended, when the Court decided that the
producers of motion pictures were accomplices in the exhibition of the film.106 Relying
on Justice Holmes’s reasoning that the performance of an act constituted a dramatization
of a novel, it would have been the exhibitors and not the producers of the motion picture,
who were liable for copyright infringement. Nonetheless, Justice Holmes expanded the
scope of copyright further by applying the law to the party, who made the infringement
possible in the first place and in this case, they were the producers of the film. By making
the films available for exhibition, Justice Holmes was of the opinion that the “producers
had effectively participated in the infringement and thus could be held as
accomplices.”107 This effectively extended copyright law to cover film production
technology, which until the decision of Kalem Company v. Harper Brothers, was not
under the purview of copyright law.
With Kalem Company v. Harper Brothers,108 a copyright owner had
control over the use of the work for film production and film producers and exhibitors
would have to obtain the consent of the copyright owner before producing and exhibiting
a movie based on an existing copyrighted work. With the production of motion pictures
falling within the purview of copyright law, motion pictures itself as a form of creative
art was soon protected as a copyrightable subject matter under the 1912 amendments to
the Copyright Act.109 Motion pictures was protected as a photograph under the Copyright
Act 1870,110 and the ruling in Edison v. Lubin,111 indicated a willingness by the courts to
105

PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 63-64 (Hill and Wang 1994)
222 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1911)
107
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 64 (Hill and Wang 1994)
108
222 U.S. 555 (1911)
109
The amendments were introduced when the motion pictures industry, faced the prospect of liability
under the earlier copyright act, which was drafted without its interest in mind, prepared a bill to amend the
Copyright Act 1909 to limit the industry’s exposure in copyright infringement actions. JESSICA LITMAN,
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 41 (Prometheus Books 2001)
110
Edison v. Lubin, 122 Fed. Rep. 240 (1903). Here, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had to decide on
whether a film, showing Kaiser Wilhelm’s yacht, “Meteor”, being christened and launched, was eligible for
copyright protection against an exact reproduction of the film, which was then used for theatrical
exhibition. The court held that a film was in effect a photograph of many exposures and was therefore to be
protected as a photograph under the Copyright Act 1870 as a work of fine art. What was interesting though,
was the willingness of the court to recognize technological development in the production of creative
works. According to District Judge Buffington, Congress in amending the Copyright Act 1831 in 1865 to
extend copyright protection to a photograph or a negative, “…must have recognized there would be change
and advance in making photographs, just as there has been in making books, printing chromos, and other
106

18

extend copyright protection to creative works, which were produced by newer
technologies. These works that were produced by new technologies were protected within
existing categories of copyrightable subject matter under the Copyright Act. The shift in
copyright law towards the protection of motion pictures reflected a more general cultural
change, where “reverence for originality and a scorn for imitation” was prevalent.112
There may be however a subtle recognition for the huge investments made in the
production of films by production companies, which justified a copyright monopoly over
motion pictures. When copyright protection was given to motion pictures in the
Copyright Act 1912,113 it was because “the money invested therein is so great and the
property rights so valuable.”114
In some cases however, the courts have been more cautious in extending
copyright protection to new uses of copyrighted works, allowing a freer flow of
information in content towards the general public. The major technological change within
the U.S. motion pictures industry occurred with the introduction of the video cassette
recorder (hereinafter “VCR”), which allowed a home user to record televised motion
pictures off a television set and play them back later or to “time shift” the broadcast of a
motion picture on a television set from its broadcast time to a later time.115 The Supreme
Court addressed the new technology by considering consumer choice as to how new
technology was used in their home to be the most important in the Court’s analysis of
whether copyright in televised motion pictures is infringed by consumer use of VCRs.
The consumer had responded well to the introduction of the VCR in the market place116
and had used the VCR primarily for “time-shifting.” Time-shifting enabled viewers to see
programs they would otherwise miss because they were not at home, were occupied with
other tasks, or were viewing a program on another station at the time of a broadcast that
they desired to watch.117 The District Court in this case inclined towards protecting the
private consumption of copyrighted materials. According to the District Court, noncommercial home use recording of materials broadcasted over the public airways was a
fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copyright infringement. The Court
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emphasized the fact that the materials were broadcasted free to the public at large, the
noncommercial character of the use, and the private character of the activity conducted
entirely within the home. The Court also recognized that the purpose of this use served
the public interest by increasing access to television programming, an interest that “is
consistent with the First Amendment policy of providing the fullest access to information
through the public airwaves.” 118
The Court of Appeals however, took a different view. The Court reversed the
District Court’s decision and concluded that as a matter of law, the home use of a VCR
could not be a fair use because it was not a “productive use.” The Court held that it was
unnecessary for the plaintiffs to prove any harm to the potential market for the
copyrighted works, but then observed that it seemed clear that the cumulative effect of
mass reproduction made possible by the VCR would tend to diminish the potential
market for the copyright owner’s work.119 It appears from the Court of Appeals’
reasoning that the Court took a more expansive view of the role of copyright in protecting
a creative work. The Court thought that where consumers of copyrighted materials
attached economic value to the use of the work in a particular manner, the copyright
owner ought to be given the opportunity to exploit that market.120 The extension of the
copyright owner’s right to markets wherein there is an economic value appears logical
given the premise that copyright law is intended to allow the producer of creative works
to capture some of the economic benefits that stem from investing and producing the
creative work. By providing a producer of creative work with control over the work, the
producer may prevent others from taking advantage of these economic benefits by
exploiting the work because this undermines the very incentive for the producer to make
these investments in the first place.121
The Supreme Court was more conservative in extending the copyright owner’s
rights over VCR technology. According to the Court, the judiciary had always been
reluctant to expand the protection afforded by copyright without explicit legislative
guidance.122 More importantly, the Court recognized the competing interests involved
whenever a new technology enters any copyright industry and the importance of drawing
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a balance amongst competing interests.123 In this case, the Supreme Court regarded the
private uses by the consumer to be an important factor that ought to be considered in
deciding whether the use of the VCR technology was an infringement of the copyright
owner’s exclusive rights. The inclusion of the private consumer of creative works and
their freedom to enjoy the benefits of a new technology in the privacy of their homes in
the Court’s analysis was a step, which the Court took to assess the fair value of a new
technology introduced into the market and whether use of it should be considered
unauthorized on the basis that the copyright owner objects to the uses to which the new
technology puts its works. Sony v. Universal City Studio124 illustrates the Supreme
Court’s regard for the consumer’s private uses of a creative work to be outside the reach
of the copyright owner even when there appears to be a threat posed by a new technology
to the copyright owner’s rights. Indeed, a consumer may choose to skip a commercial,
fast forward the program to favored scenes125 or simply record televised programs for the
purposes of building a library,126 and this does not differ from a purchaser of a novel
reading only specific parts of the novel, skipping parts of the novel or making copies of
the novel for a private home library. It would be difficult to imagine with the introduction
of the photocopier machine, a new technology introduced in 1960,127 that a novelist
would have control over his novel to the extent that a purchaser of the novel may be
prohibited from making copies of the novel on a private home photocopier. Even the
making of photocopies of medical journals by the National Institutes of Health and the
National Library of Medicine for physicians and medical researchers for use in their
professional work was thought to be outside the control of the publisher, who was the
owner of the copyright over the medical journals.128 The point to be made is that the
control of a copyright owner over his work does not necessarily stretch to every new use
of the work with a new technology.
The Supreme Court in Sony v. Universal City Studios,129 dealt with a novel and
new technology by considering largely the general societal benefits, which the new
technology brought and regarded that these benefits far outweighed a more nebulous
claim by the copyright owner that the use of the VCR crosses “invisible boundaries” of
123
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control that a copyright owner has over his programs.130 Regarding the use of the VCR
for home time-shifting purposes to be a fair use of a copyright owner’s content, the
Supreme Court emphasized the requirement that the copyright owner demonstrate some
likelihood of harm before a private act of time-shifting is to be condemned as a violation
of federal law.131 The Supreme Court, referring to the Court of Appeal’s analysis that the
use of content may be regarded to be fair use only when such use is productive, regarded
the lower court’s reasoning to be erroneous. According to the Supreme Court, Congress
has plainly instructed the courts that a fair use analysis calls for a sensitive balancing of
interests and whilst the distinction between “productive” and “unproductive uses” may be
helpful in calibrating the balance, it cannot be wholly determinative.132 More importantly,
according to the Supreme Court, the statutory provision requires a consideration of the
economic consequences of copying.133 As it was demonstrated that a substantial number
of copyright holders would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by private
viewers134 and as it could not be shown that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of
non-minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted works, the
Supreme Court decided that the VCR was capable of substantial non-infringing uses and
the sale of the VCR to the general public did not constitute contributory infringement of
the copyright.135
The significance of the Sony v. Universal City Studios136 case is that the Court had
cognizance of the fact that new technologies offer the general public new and novel uses
of copyrighted materials. Where these technologies pose a threat to the control, which
copyright owners have over the manner which works are used, the Court recognized its
limited role and ability in extending the scope of copyright protection without Congress
explicitly legislating on the matter. This is a clear shift away from the decision of Kalem
Company v. Harper Brothers,137 where the Supreme Court was keener then to include a
new technology and a growing industry within the scope of the Copyright Act, primarily
because of the economic potential and profits, which the motion pictures industry will
make from the theatrical exhibitions of films.138 The VCR technology in Sony v.
Universal City Studios139 on the other hand, was a technology that allowed its consumers
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to copy a copyrighted work and was not a technology that allowed the reproduction of the
work in a different manner of expression.140 Adopting this line of reasoning, it may also
be said that a dramatization of a novel in the form of a motion picture is an act that
encroaches upon a separate market, which a novelist may wish to later explore and
should therefore be unauthorized. The motion pictures production technology in Kalem
Company v. Harper Bros.141 provided the opportunity for motion pictures producers to
exploit a dramatization right that Congress intended for the copyright holder and the
Supreme Court in that case recognized the opportunities, which the new technology
provided a growing and thriving motion pictures industry.
Time-shifting of televised motion pictures for private consumption, on the other
hand, was not a use of a technology that encroached upon a right, which Congress had
intended for the copyright holder. Although it is possible to easily concede with Justice
Blackmun in his dissenting opinion in Sony v. Universal City Studios,142 that the VCR
technology allows home television users to infringe copyright by recording off-the-air,
which is not only the foreseeable use of the VCR but also its intended use, and that Sony,
the producer of the VCR ought to be liable for inducing and materially contributing to the
infringing conduct of VCR owners,143 this line of reasoning is premised on the
assumption that Congress had intended to provide a content owner control over the very
right that Justice Blackmun speaks about – the right to time-shift televised motion
pictures in the privacy of a consumer’s home. Justice Stevens in delivering the majority
opinion of the Supreme Court however recognized that this may be a right that Congress
did not intend for the copyright owner to have.144 Justice Stevens exercised caution by
letting Congress take the lead in looking at the new technology as Congress had
examined other innovations in the past. It was not the job of the courts, Justice Stevens
reasoned, to apply laws that have not been written.145
In deference to Congress’ role to pass laws to extend copyright where new
technologies emerge, the Supreme Court took a stance that the courts’ role in extending
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the rights of a copyright holder is limited, even when new technologies pose a threat to
the right a copyright holder had in the work. The courts, in deciding the proper treatment
to give technological advances, are always reluctant to extend copyright protection over
new uses of content when a new technology is introduced, especially where the new
technology allow home users the flexibility of using the content in the way they choose.
In deciding whether community antenna television (CATV) systems, which receive,
amplify and modulate signals from television stations and retransmit them to their
subscriber television sets, infringed upon the performance right of a copyright owner, the
Supreme Court had to once again address the implications a new technology posed to the
existing industry.146 The Supreme Court felt that only broadcasters, such as television
stations, were “performers” of a copyright owner’s content and falling within the purview
of the copyright act, would be liable for unauthorized broadcasts of the work. Cable
companies however, were mere viewers of content because such companies merely
enhance other viewer’s ability to receive a broadcaster’s signals and therefore did not
infringe upon the performance right of a copyright owner. Declining to allow copyright
owners to control the flow of information in copyrighted works through new
communications technology, the Supreme Court once again left it to Congress to legislate
on the matter.147
The industries do have recourse to Congress to enact more specific rights in
response to technological changes in the industry and obvious efforts have been made to
lobby for stronger and longer copyright monopolies to control information flow in
content.148 While Congress has responded to the changes brought about by sometimes
enacting laws to allow for increasing control over copyrighted content,149 Congress may
in effect enact laws, which prevent the free flow of information in copyrighted works and
affect economic growth in the long-run.150 Furthermore, if copyright law is necessary to
provide an incentive for the production of creative content,151 the enactm
ent of stronger
copyright laws really permit the industry to “leverage its control from an old world into
the new” and provide the industries with a right to control technological development in a
146
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new industry.152 More importantly however, is that as the pace of technological change
quickens, Congress has become less and less able and willing to adjust copyright laws to
these changes, especially where a “proposed imposition of copyright liability disrupts
entrenched consumer habits.”153 The point made here is that, like the courts, Congress has
a limited role to play in developing copyright laws to accommodate technological
change.
In A.M. Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,154 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California took a remarkably different approach from the Supreme
Court in the Sony v. Universal City Studios case. In this case, A.M. Records and
seventeen other record companies filed a complaint for contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement and unfair competition against Napster, Inc., an Internet start-up,
which allowed its users to download MP3 music files for free. The Napster software
technology featured a browser interface, search engine and chat functions and operated in
conjunction with Napster’s online network of servers that allowed its users to compile
and store lists of other account holders’ user names.155 The Napster software may also be
used to play and categorize audio files, which users can store in specific file directories
on their hard drives. These directories, which allow users to share files on Napster,
constitute the “user library” and while some users store their files in these libraries, others
do not.156 The peer-to-peer file sharing network connected millions of computers
worldwide and allowed its software users to search for MP3 files containing digital music
over the Internet,157 file share their music without having to go through a centralized
server158 and find and chat with other MP3 users while using online Internet Relay Chat
(hereinafter “IRC”).159 With the Napster code made freely available for download on the
Internet, millions of Internet users began to share and trade music through the Internet.
This caused alarm within the industry because the technology facilitated the distribution
of copyrighted works in an unprecedented manner.
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In defense to the claim of copyright infringement,160 Napster raised the defense of
fair use. Napster also argued that the use of the Napster technology was of a substantial
non-infringing use, as argued by the Supreme Court in Sony v. Universal City Studios.161
Going through the four pronged test for the finding of fair use, the Court decided that the
use of Napster was for private use,162 that copyrighted musical compositions and sound
recordings were creative in nature,163 that the downloading or uploading of the
copyrighted work constituted a copying of the entire work164 and that the market for
copyrighted works owned by the copyright owners was harmed by the use of Napster.165
The Court further dismissed any claims made by Napster, Inc. of potential fair uses of the
Napster service – sampling of music, space-shifting of music and the authorized
distribution of new artist’s work. According to the Court, the Napster service allowed its
users to obtain permanent copies of songs that they would have otherwise had to purchase
and carried with it the potential for “viral distribution to millions of people.”166 It is
interesting to note that the Court distinguished Sony v. Universal City Studios167 from the
present case on the basis that time-shifting of televised broadcasts in Sony allowed its
viewers to watch a work that the copyright owner had made available to the home viewer
free of charge, while the recording companies in the Napster case almost always charged
consumers for the use of their music. The court reasoned that this is an infringement of
the copyright for Napster to make music available in such a manner to its users.168
The Court’s decision to stretch copyright law to prevent the use of copyrighted
works by users of Napster brings copyright law into a new dimension, where the law is
now used to prevent the development of new markets,169 limit consumer choice as to the

160

A case for copyright infringement was established by showing that virtually all Napster users engaged in
unauthorized downloading and uploading of copyrighted music; as much as eighty-seven percent of files
available on Napster may have been copyrighted and more than seventy percent may have been owned and
administered by the plaintiffs in the case. See id. at 911
161
464 U.S. 417 (1984)
162
The Court held that although the use of Napster was not for commercial purposes, the vast scale of
Napster use amongst anonymous individuals in the downloading and uploading of MP3 files using Napster,
showed that the uses were not private. A host user sending a file cannot be said to engage in a personal use
when distributing that file to an anonymous requester. Moreover, the fact that Napster users got for free
what they would have otherwise paid for suggests that they reap economic benefit from Napster use. 114 F.
Supp. 2d 896, 912 (2000)
163
As these works are creative in nature, they constitute entertainment, which cuts against a finding of fair
use. See id. at 913
164
See id. at 913
165
This happens by reducing sales among college students and raises barriers to the copyright owner’s
entry into the market for digital downloading of music. 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 (2000)
166
See id. at 913
167
464 U.S. 417 (1984)
168
114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 (2000)
169
The plaintiffs in this case demonstrated by a substantial likelihood that it would adversely affect the
potential market for their copyrighted works if the use of the Napster service became widespread. The
plaintiffs claim three general types of harm – a decrease in retail sales, especially among college students;
an obstacle to the plaintiff’s future entry into the digital downloading market; and a social devaluing of
music stemming from its free distribution. 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 914 (2000)

26

use of the work170 and prevent the displacement of sales171 in the present industry by the
introduction of a new technology that changes the existing mechanism and workings of
the industry.172 The process of technological change that is vital to the development and
growth to any industry was therefore curtailed by the decision in A.M. Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc. 173 Judge Patel, in delivering the decision of the Court to grant an injunction
against Napster to discontinue its services, was of the opinion that “the business interests
of an infringer does not trump a right holder’s entitlement to copyright protection.” In
dismissing the fact that the decision would destroy Napster’s user base and make its
service technologically infeasible, the Court had effectively tilted the direction of
technological development backward. Being of the opinion that the destruction of
Napster, Inc. by the injunction was speculative compared to the massive damage caused
by the unauthorized downloading and uploading of the plaintiff’s copyrighted works,
Judge Patel had allowed the industry to control the course of information flow at the
expense of cultural, technological and industrial development. The decision of the Court
in Napster illustrates the control, which copyright owners have over the flow in
copyrighted content through copyright law.
The sound recording industry faces different challenges from other content
industries, such as the motion pictures industry. Music files are more easily compressed
and distributed because they are significantly smaller than motion pictures files.174 Users
are also able to participate in the distribution of music content by “ripping”175 a song
from a CD and posting it on the Internet.176 These are two salient reasons that make the
170
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UCLA ENT. L. REV. 57, 62 (1999)
175
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Match’s Jukebox software product is available on the company’s website for $30.00 and this is an encoder,
which is eight times faster than other encoders. There are other slower encoders that can be downloaded for
free at various Internet website. See id. at 64
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consumers will begin to invest in the distribution of the material directly. In the case of Napster for
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control of music distribution over the Internet a challenge for the sound recording
industry. Digital media technology and the Internet have begun to empower recording
artists and musicians by allowing them to produce and distribute their works. This paper
addresses two aspects of the sound recording industry, which will affect the flow of
information between the recording studio and the consuming public. The sound recording
contract and the opportunities to connect directly with listeners of music on the Internet
are two significant factors, which are causing independent sound recording artists and
musicians to produce and distribute music to listeners without a sound recording studio.
Artists Recording Contracts and the Sound Recordings Industry
One of the more fundamental aspects of the sound recording industry is the
relationship between the recording studio and the artist. This relationship is significantly
altered by the Internet and digital technologies, which offer artists an alternative from
what is deemed to be an onerous relationship against artists’ interests. Traditional artists
recording contracts are considered to be onerous especially when the contract is signed at
the beginning of the artist’s career.177 The onerous terms in the contract are often justified
on the premise that the recording company is taking a substantial risk with an artist that is
yet unknown for there is no certainty if the recording company is going to recover the
expenses spent on making a new artist popular or widely- known.178 Artists have been
known to file for bankruptcy to escape the contractual provisions of the recording
contract179 simply because the artist is not capable of meeting the terms of the recording
contract despite increasing popularity.180 With the Internet and digital technologies
example, the consuming public funded and created the distribution channel for digital music by the
purchase of “computers, modems, storage media and Internet service.” Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers
and Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 539, 565-566 (2003)
177
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sell platinum albums. Lynn Morrow, The Recording Artist Agreement: Does it Empower or Enslave?, 3
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 40, 43 (2001)
178
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copyright as an employee of the recording company and not as an independent contractor, contracted by the
recording company to perform the sound recording. Second is the exception to California’s seven year
statute that allows artist recording contracts to be enforced after seven years and the lobbying efforts to
change the law to allow an artist, who is negotiating a contract for the first time to be bound to the contract
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from $175,000 to $350,000, with advancements to superstars exceeding one million dollars, must be repaid
to the recording company by the artist despite the fact that the cost of producing an album is so excessive
that the artist retains very little or no money from royalty income on the sale of a record for personal use.
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An artist’s financial difficulties are attributed to the lack of business savvy and foresight when signing
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producers and booking agents. The compensation package for the artist requiring the artist to repay the
recording company for “recording expenses, packaging costs, promotional copies of records for radio
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however, artists do have greater leverage power in negotiating these recording contracts,
as artists may now be able to sign on with independent record labels.181 Independent
record labels are not affiliated with a major record company and use the Internet and
digital technologies as a primary marketing, promotion and distribution channel for the
new artist. The signing of a record deal with a major recording company may no longer
be “crucial” to developing an artist’s potential and to reaping the rewards that fame may
bring.182 The possibilities of marketing, promotion and distribution through channels
opened up by the Internet and new technologies require the sound recordings industry to
rethink contractual provisions that may no longer be relevant to an artist, who is looking
at the Internet and digital technologies as an alternative path to audience popularity and
musical success. The Eagles, one of the most successful rock bands in American music
history,183 for example, has released their new single, “Hole in the World” under their
own Eagles Recording Company IT Label and will release their new studio album
themselves despite offers from a few major record labels.184 Folk singer Natalie Merchant
has also started her own record label, Mythic America, and has released her new solo
album, “The House Carpenter’s Daughter” through her website and selected retailers,
after obtaining release from Elektra Records, a division of AOL-Time Warner.185 The
rock band Pearl Jam has also freed itself from a decade-long contract with Epic Records,
a division of Sony Music, to build an “Internet-based-direct-distribution arrangement that
allow fans to buy recordings of live performances following each show.”186

stations and retail stores, records given to distributors as an incentive to purchase, portions of marketing
and radio promotions and anticipated returned copies” as well as cross-collateralization of proceeds from a
subsequent successful album to recoup any losses the record label experienced on the artist’s earlier
albums, contribute to the artist’s difficulties in making enough from the royalty income to repay the
recording company for the advancement made to them. David C. Norrell, The Strong Get Stronger: Record
Labels Benefit from Proposed Changes to the Bankruptcy Code, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 445, 454-456
(1999)
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There are several terms of the recording contract, which may not be applicable
where music is sold independently though the Internet.187 The packaging charge or
packaging deduction clause188 has no application on the Internet as digital downloads of
music content will not have to be packaged in the manner as it is conventionally
understood in the artist recording contract.189 Free goods provisions in the recording
contract that allow the recording company to give away free copies of the record190
should be revised to accommodate the distribution of music content through the
Internet.191 Promotional copies of records given away by the recording company for
promotion, such as radio-station copies for air-play and record stores copies for in-store
listening,192 are likely to have no application to digitally distributed music content on the
Internet.193 The distribution of music content through the Internet may also render
187

Ryan S. Henriquez, Facing the Music on the Internet: Identifying Divergent Strategies for Different
Segments of the Music Industry in Approaching Digital Distribution, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 57, 112-118
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“reserves against returns” clauses that allow a record company to withhold royalty
payments to the artist until it is certain that the sale to the retailer is final194 and
“breakage” clauses that reduce an artist’s royalty by any losses incurred due to a breakage
of records during shipment,195 obsolete and no longer applicable for Internet and digital
sale of music content. A revision of the recording contract is important because it defines
the relationship between the recording artist and the recording company. If the “sole
purpose of a record company is to sell records,” and the recording artist is the “record
company’s most valuable asset,”196 the opportunities presented by the Internet and digital
media technologies enable the artist to create another flow of content from the artists to
the user of music by independently producing and distributing music without a sound
recording company.
While it used to be that the recording company chooses the artist it wishes to
bring to stardom, artists today have a greater leverage against the recording company,
which they did not use to have until they reached immense popularity with music fans. It
may be argued that “without the money, marketing and distribution of an established
record company, it is extremely unlikely that an artist will break through the cluttered
market and reach the level of success necessary to sustain a career, much less to become
a superstar”197 and it is indeed acceptable that the recording company is still an integral
component to an artist’s path to stardom. However, it is submitted in this paper that the
practices of the recording companies are sufficiently onerous on the artist that an artist
194
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seeking an alternative path to success or whose perception of success involves the
distribution of his or her own creative music without a recording company’s constraints,
would inevitably see the Internet and digital technologies as an opportune channel for
creative musical expression. With the ability of music to create a culture in itself, it is
submitted that the Internet and digital technologies presents the perfect environment for
the creation of new genres of music that breaks away from mainstream popular music.
Today, the possibility of recording artists collectively boycotting recording contracts with
major record labels and distributing their content through the Internet digitally is not
inconceivable if sound recordings companies are not willing to change the balance of the
recording company-recording artist contractual relationship.198
The recording companies are taking steps in this direction to rebalance the
contractual relationship with recording artists. BMG, one of the largest music publishing
companies,199 is the first recording company to break away from conventional recording
contracts by removing deduction clauses from the contract and agreeing to pay artists a
standard rate for music content sold in any format,200 paying royalty for net income from
licenses of music content to third parties201 and limiting new contracts to the production
and sale of one album with the option of extending the contract to three more albums.202
The new contract also has more equitable terms with the introduction of a fixed level of
studio recording costs for each album for which artists will not be charged for and the
decision to pay advances to artists on a monthly basis throughout the duration of the
contract ensures that recording artists become more responsible for their financial
budgets.203 At the same time, Universal Music Group, a leading music company, whose
global operations encompass the development, manufacture, marketing, sales and
distribution of recorded music,204 and Warner Brothers Records205 are considering
198
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offering better royalty rates to their artists for digital downloads.206 It is submitted that the
revision of contractual terms in the standard recording contract by recording companies is
appropriate especially where the traditional methods of commercializing music content
are undergoing transformation due to the opportunities that the Internet and digital
technologies offer artists today. Nonetheless, it is difficult to believe that in the long run,
traditional artist-recording company relationships will persist to exist as it does now.
Popular Internet sites such as Garage Band207 and CD Baby208 offer independent artists
the ability to sell their music content independently and have found considerable and
notable successes, giving artists a very real and tangible option to market, promote and
sell their music content directly to the consumer without reliance on a record label.
Furthermore, these Internet sites extend their services to the music consumer that go
beyond the distribution of a packaged set of music that the recording company believes to
be the kind of music the consumer would want to receive.
The purchase of individual singles through digital downloads without being
bundled is becoming more common after recording companies realized their consumers’
value for autonomy in their consumption of music and announced to the media that they
no longer want the lack of content to drive consumer usage of peer-to-peer networks.209
With hindsight after peer-to-peer file sharing of music content through the Internet took
unprecedented heights when Napster’s popularity was at its peak, it appears that
recording companies are reconsidering their manner of music content distribution over
the Internet. The five major record labels – Sony Music Entertainment, EMI Recorded
Music, Warner Music Group, BMG and Universal Music Group – have begun to provide
better services, which music fans are willing to pay for. This includes allowing music
content to be downloaded through the Internet from online music services such as
Apple’s iTunes,210 which feature tracks from all five major record labels.211 Some
recording artists are reluctant to license their recordings for digital download through the
Internet because of concerns with the piracy of music content, the low rate of current
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licensing fees or to protect their catalogue by holding it back until demand is higher.212
Although the Internet and digital technologies do not present a Utopia for the online
marketing, promotion and distribution of music content, these technologies have
permeated the industry and its consumer base to such an extent that the structure of the
industry is permanently altered. The values of music consumers, the very relationship
between technology and copyright law and the nature of music itself are compelling
factors that are impelling a changing trend within the industry. An increasing number of
artists are turning to the Internet and digital technologies to market, promote and
distribute their music and it may be argued that a completely new music culture is in the
process of formation with the way the Internet and digital technologies have affected and
are affecting the consumer’s experience of music. This paper addresses this point next.
The Recording Artist and New Technologies
An increasing number of recording artists are turning to the Internet and digital
technologies to market, promote and distribute their music content and it may be seen
that these new technologies are providing the artist with a certain degree of autonomy for
the creative expression of their individual music style. New artists have now begun to
rely on the Internet and digital technologies as well as their own talent to provide them
with the public exposure to ensure that their music is heard and sold.213 The evolution of
music production, promotion and distribution from being record label centric to the more
diffused technological environment of the Internet has a profound impact on the
traditional method of commercializing music content whereby a single successful artist
compensates for all other investments a record company makes in producing, promoting
and distributing the music of other artists.214 This business model, which has been
aggressively used to justify the imposition of high CD prices, the enactment of stronger
copyright laws and the strict enforcement of copyright laws against pirates by the sound
recordings industry,215 may now become peripheral as new artists embrace the
possibilities that the Internet offer by producing, marketing, promoting and distributing
their own music without depending on a traditional record label to create the necessary
public exposure for the successful commercialization of their creative work.
212
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The proliferation of Internet sites promoting independent artists and providing a
channel for the artist to reach out to a large consumer base is creating a new genre of
music, which appeals to consumers and listeners of music. Structurally, the Internet is
poised to deliver music content to a sufficiently large number of music listeners that there
may be a shift in consumer preference for particular genres of music that were
conventionally not carried by record labels. In the 1940s, radio listeners developed a taste
for less contemporary music when radio broadcasters started broadcasting music from
Broadcast Music, Inc.’s (BMI) catalogue of music as their signal of rejection of the
higher licensing fees that were being imposed by the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP). As a result of the radio stations’ refusal to broadcast
the more contemporary sound recordings licensed by ASCAP and their opting to
broadcast “hillbilly” and “race” music on BMI’s catalogue instead, country music and
black music, which originated from music that was regarded less esteemed than the music
of George Gershwin, Jerome Kern, Cole Porter, Rodgers and Hart and all of the most
popular music from Hollywood films and Broadway plays that were on ASCAP’s music
catalogue, are today popular music genres in their own right.216 The same occurrence
may be seen to be happening today as an increasing number of artists turn to the Internet
and digital technologies to promote their music and distribute their own music without
the backing of a major record label. This movement of recording artists away from a
major record label’s more conventional packaging of their image towards a more
personal delivery of an authentic and creative expression of individual music may pave
the way for the consumer’s appreciation for a new genre of music that major record
labels had previously dismissed. Independent recording artists utilizing the Internet to
market, promote and distribute their work have the freedom to create their own music,
develop their own talent and deliver their authentic individual music style to the
consumer and this has appealed to many consumers of music. Clay Aiken and Ruben
Studdard, who were winners of the hit television series “American Idol,”217 have
developed successful music recordings without the backing of a major record label,
primarily because their individual music style had appealed to a general music
audience.218
The major record labels have been in a position to exert a great degree of control
over the sound recording industry, its recording artists and its consumers through its
various business models and industrial structures. This has been done through various
216
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methods, such as the onerous terms of the artists recording contract, the sale of music in a
bundle, requiring the consumer to purchase an entire CD to obtain a single track, the
production of music that appeals to general contemporary tastes and the strict
enforcement of copyright laws against technology developers and consumers. These
controls, exerted by the industry have alienated major record labels within the music
industry219 and may be said to be akin to the controls that ASCAP exerted over the public
performance of popular music in hotels, restaurants, motion picture and commercial radio
broadcasts through their licensing agreements220 from the period between 1914, when
ASCAP was established, to the end of 1939, when BMI was established.221 Creative
artists, such as music publishers, composers and writers, had also begun to rely on
ASCAP to help them make a living as social and economic circumstances changed by
making ASCAP membership a necessary condition for success within the industry.222
ASCAP then went on to develop internal membership structures to control their
members223 as well as maintain certain membership policies, which excluded artists
within particular genres of music,224 in ways that are not very different from the practices
219
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of the present major record labels towards recording artists, who sign a recording contract
with them as well as recording artists, whose music is dismissed or ignored by the major
record labels for belonging to a less contemporary genre of music.
This is particularly relevant in thinking about the commercialization of music
content with the use of the Internet and digital technologies today because the willingness
of major record labels to sign recording contracts with certain types of artists while
excluding certain other music genres, such as “garage band” music, from their record
labels, has the effect of segregating the music market. This creates an environment
whereby independent record labels or artists bearing their own record label are driven to
market, promote and distribute their music through different business models and with
the far reaching effects of the structure of the Internet and digital technologies, it is not
very difficult to imagine the growth of a consumer base for non-mainstream music that is
conventionally marketed, promoted and distributed by major labels. It may also be
envisaged that independent record or artist labels carrying new genres of music may
reach a far wider audience through their more flexible business models225 to create
greater product diversity within the music industry by competing with major record labels
in a way that parallels BMI’s entry into the music industry in the 1940s in competition
with ASCAP and the resulting increase in the number of music publishers and writers in
the music market place with access to performance rights income as well as the greater
diversity in popular music. If the period from 1938 to 1941 is regarded as “one of the
most critical in the history of the music industry” because this was when “forces within
the industry, which had been building for years, finally resulted in intense conflict
between ASCAP and the broadcasting industry,”226 this part of the paper presents that the
music industry is at present at another critical point, where independent music is likely to
proliferate through the Internet to penetrate the music consumer base, which major record
labels had been in control of from as early as 1985227 and whilst radio broadcasting
technology was the propelling force in the 1940s to produce a breakaway from ASCAP’s
control of the music industry, Internet and digital media technologies are the propelling
force in today’s music industry.
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The emergence of various Internet sites such as MusicDistribution.com228 to assist
independent recording artists to obtain exposure with consumers of music, provide
independent artists with artistic control over their own creative work and allow artists to
generate income from their music though the promotion, distribution and sale of their
music over the Internet by the provision of online music distribution services. CD
Baby,229 which was started in 1997 by Derek Sivers, an independent musician himself, is
an online record store that has emerged as the second largest seller of independent CDs
over the Internet after Amazon.com.230 CD Baby has sold 826,289 CDs over the Internet
and has paid $6,662,797 to independent artists, who have sold their CDs on CD Baby. As
many as 57,120 artists sell their music over the Internet through CD Baby. CD Baby also
assists independent artists distribute their music through digital downloading services
provided by Apple’s iTunes and Listen.com’s Rhapsody231 services by digitally encoding
music from an independent artist’s CD at the artist’s request and submitting it the to
iTunes and Rhapsody online stores.
GarageBand provides another channel for an aspiring artist to make his or her
work known to an online music community by offering exposure to unsigned or amateur
musicians through the posting of their music on their website to obtain feedback from
other musicians while allowing new artists the opportunity to listen to music of other
independent artists. GarageBand provides artists, who post their music on their website “a
chance to discover what others are doing with their studio time.”232 More importantly
however, GarageBand has entered several partnerships with radio stations and webcasters
to play music of artists who have posted music on their site and gotten high listener
reviews. Many radio stations recognize GarageBand as the best source for new songs for
emerging artists and agreeing to add music from the site to their playlists. With the site’s
massive database of songs, it is able to offer each radio station and webcaster music,
which is tailored to the individual radio station’s or webcaster’s criteria. This provides
artists a new venue for the promotion of their music, offers radio stations and webcasters
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music free from public performance and digital performance royalties and gives music
consumers more diversity in their range of music.233
The commercialization of music through the Internet and digital technologies by
independent artists has produced a new culture in the public consumption of music as
well as in the commercialization of music. As black and country artists began to receive
public performance royalties from the radio broadcasts of their work after the
establishment of BMI in the music market, independent artists today are able to obtain
royalties from the digital download of their music through the Internet and through the
newer business models that independent record labels have developed for online
marketing, promotion and distribution of music content. It is foreseeable that independent
music carried by independent labels through the Internet today will produce a diversified
music market that caters to a wide array of music preferences. Creative musical
expression will be permanently changed as more independent artists reach out to the
consumer of music through the Internet. While the consumer culture that developed a
preference for black and country music grew as a result of the competition between
ASCAP and BMI for scarce resources of music for radio broadcasts,234 the present
culture for other forms of music that reflect an artist’s individual music style is a result of
an abundance of creative talents that have had no channels for expression and distribution
with the prior business models adopted by the major record labels.
With Internet and digital technologies, the commercialization of sound recordings
is unlikely to return to the way it was before. Family-values music, for example, may
develop as a new genre with MusicDistribution.com’s FaveStreet service and
GarageBand’s artists may find greater satisfaction with a site that allows direct
interaction with other musicians and music listeners, who may appreciate and honestly
comment on their music than sign a recording contract with a major record label, which
may restrict their creative artistic style.235 As with the impact of BMI’s entry into the
music market, which was not immediately evident,236 it is submitted that the collective
impact of recording artists utilizing Internet and digital media technologies to market,
233
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promote and distribute their work, independent record labels channeling new music
through the radio stations and webcasters and the general consumer receptiveness for new
forms of music will have a profound impact on the sound recording industry. Although
this is not evident now, the impact of recording artists utilizing new technologies to
commercialize music content will emerge eventually as deep-rooted changes to the
present state of the sound recording industry. As information flow in copyrighted content
is enhanced by the Internet and digital media technologies and as more users become
aware of their ability to affect the flow of information in content through the use of such
technologies, there will be a need to draw a clear balance between the rights of the author
to control the use of works and the rights of the public to have access to the works for
developmental and transformative purposes. Several mechanisms in copyright law serve
this purpose and these mechanisms are addressed in Part 3 of this paper.

Part 3: The Private Interest – Public Interest Balance
In the United States, copyright laws are enacted under the Copyright Clause of the
United States Constitution, which grants Congress the power to “promote the progress of
science and the useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries.”237 Under the United States
copyright regime, the author is placed as the primary recipient of copyright protection for
literary and creative works. In order that a creative work be protected under copyright
law, the requirement that the work be an original expression of authorship must be met.
In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,238 an action was brought for the
infringement of copyright in a photograph. It was argued that a photograph was not a
writing nor the production of the author and was therefore not eligible for copyright
protection under the constitutional clause. The Supreme Court decided that the terms
“writings” and “authors” are “susceptible to a more enlarged definition”239 than an author
and a written book. An author, according to the Supreme Court, is “he to whom anything
owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature.”240
An author therefore is a person to whom a creative work owes its existence. The Supreme
Court in Goldstein v. California241 further elaborated that the terms “writings” and
“authors” in the constitutional clause have not been construed narrowly in their literal
sense but rather with the “reach necessary to reflect the broad scope of constitutional
principles.”242 The Supreme Court went on to state that “while an “author” may be
viewed as an individual who writes an original composition, the term in its constitutional
sense have been construed to mean an “originator,” “he to whom everything owes its
origins.”243 It may be seen that central to the concept of an author is the notion that there
is not only the production of a creative work but also the element of originality. The
237
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Supreme Court in Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.244 elaborates
this point more clearly when it decided that factual compilations, such as a telephone
directory consisting of white pages did not qualify for copyright protection because
compilation of facts failed to meet the originality requirement of the constitutional clause.
The Court stated, “the originality requirement … remains the touchstone of copyright
protection today”245 and based its decision on this “bedrock principle of copyright”246 that
“no one may claim originality as to facts”247 because “facts do not owe their origin to an
act of authorship.”248
The emphasis on originality as a qualification for copyright protection creates a
division between the private rights of an author as the originator of the creative work and
the general public interest to have access to the work.249 The balance that copyright law
seeks to achieve is fundamentally a balance between private property rights of authors
and rights of the public within the public domain. There are difficulties in drawing a fair
balance between both interests and the difficulties become evident in the judiciary’s
application of the various copyright doctrines. The idea-expression dichotomy for
example, exists to ensure that only creative expressions of authors are protected under the
law, leaving ideas, “the building blocks of creativity”250 freely available for the public’s
use.251 The demarcation is however not an easy one to draw and Judge Hand in Peter Pan
Fabrics Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.252 alluded to this difficulty by stating that “obviously
no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the ‘idea,’ and
has borrowed the ‘expression.’ Decisions must inevitably be ad hoc.”253 Judge Hand
elaborates the point further in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,254 where the District
Court for the Southern District of New York had to decide if a subsequent motion picture
with the same underlying story line infringed an earlier play.255 The other copyright
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doctrine that attempts to draw a fair balance between private property rights and the
public interests is the fair use doctrine that allows the use of copyrighted materials “if it is
done for a salutary purpose,”256 such as “news reporting, teaching, criticism.”257 In Time,
Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates,258 the use of copyrighted photographs of President John
F. Kennedy’s assassination in a book written about the assassination was held to be a fair
use of the copyrighted material. Although photographs were protected under the
copyright act as a copyrightable subject matter, the District Court for the S.D. New York
held that the “public interest in having the fullest information available on the murder of
President Kennedy”259 prevailed over the private property rights of the copyright owner
in the photographs.
The balance to be drawn between private property rights and the public interest is
the central issue in current copyright debates that pertain to the development of new
technologies in the market place that shift the traditional boundaries between private
property and public interests set by the analog world. Where “the principal content
industries – publishing, sound recording, film and television industries – formed,
developed and thrived around analog technology platforms in part because they
inherently impeded unauthorized reproduction and distribution of works of
authorship,”260 the content industries today are faced with the prospect of
commercializing their content in a digitized environment that “has afforded consumers
unprecedented power to access, store, manipulate, reproduce and distribute entertainment
content,”261 which as a result has caused the industries to undergo a loss of control over
their content. This balance between private property interests and the public interest is not
an easy one to draw and the “law’s divide between private property and the public
domain”262 constantly “shifts not only with the views of particular judges but also with
national boundaries and with cultural attitudes.”263
The difficulty in drawing a fair balance between both the private and public
interests is that American copyright jurisprudence is based on two separate and distinct
ideologies about the protection that is due to the author of creative works. The school of
thought that is based on principles of natural justice argues that authors should be given
their dues for the production of creative works and that copyright protection should be
extended where and when an author would be entitled to reap the rewards from the
production of a creative work. The other school of thought is based on an incentive
theory, which is that an author should only be given rights to the extent that it provides an
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author with the economic incentive to produce creative works and any grant of rights that
exceed the incentive of an author to create would be regarded as “an encroachment on the
general freedom of everyone to write and say what they please.”264 The different schools
of thought have been labeled differently in the academic literature to illustrate the same
point. The natural rights school of thought has been labeled “a theory of moral
deserts,”265 “the copyright optimists”266 or “the neoclassicist approach”267 and the other
school of thought as “expressed in terms of economic incentives,”268 the “copyright
pessimists”269 or “the minimalist position.”270 Although both these school of thoughts
differ as to the scope to which copyright protection should be granted to authors of
creative works, both do agree that there is a necessity for there to be enough protection to
encourage authors to produce creative works.271 Arguments to strengthen copyright
protection today as new technologies emerge and as content is increasingly distributed
through the Internet, whether based on natural justice or on the economic incentive
theory, have asserted greater property rights against the public domain.272
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In recent years, there has been increasing attention paid to the public domain as
the pool of common resources that is freely available to the general public for use. The
focus on the public domain stems primarily from proponents of lesser protection under
the copyright regime on the basis that content can only be developed when there is a large
amount of free resources to draw from.273 It has been argued that a larger public domain
is necessary for authorship to thrive and that the grant of extensive property rights in
creative works prevents new authors from creating works built upon existing materials.274
Indeed, a rich and diverse public domain is vital to the growth of the creative content
industries for authors require a large amount of resources to develop and create new
works. After all, “the public domain is the law’s primary safeguard of the raw material
that makes authorship possible.”275 Nonetheless, there are opposing view points contrary
to this low protectionist point of view on a general theory of the public domain.276 It has
been argued that there really is no general theory of the public domain and that “the
public domain is simply what remains after all methods of protection are taken into
account.”277 While authorship thrives on a rich and diverse public domain and a creative
work is “necessarily a recombination or transformation of what has gone before,”278 the
grant of property rights to authors for their creative works does not necessarily have an
adverse impact on “the enterprise of authorship”279 because the recognition of a property
273
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right in creative works is only “in those elements of the work, small as they may be, that
the author has contributed.”280 In fact, it is argued that authorship thrives where authors
are ensured of a market in which their works may be commercialized and that there is
indeed a necessity for the law to provide copyright protection in authors’ works so that
authors may be able to establish these necessary markets for the commercialization of
their works. The argument for more extensive rights have been premised on the
protection of authors in the digital age by extending rights “into every corner where
consumers derive value from literary and artistic works”281 as this would be the most
appropriate way to connect authors with their audiences “free from interference by
political sovereigns or the will of patrons.”282
As new technologies develop in the market place, the extension of rights under
the copyright regime ought to be done with a great degree of caution. The growth of the
content industries, as well as the general growth of society, technology and culture
depends on the building and use of existing creative materials that are easily accessible.
The extension of rights to protect authors may indeed be feasible, considering the
increasing number of authors, who make their works available through the Internet and
digital technologies. The empowerment independent sound recording artists have as a
result of the new distribution channels that the Internet has opened up for the distribution
of their sound recordings may also require an extension of authors’ rights. Indeed,
authors must have their rights in their works protected to ensure that rewards due to the
author for the production of creative works are fairly given.283 However, there is a
general necessity for creative works of authorship to be made available for the general
public’s use as the imposition of strong property rights against certain uses of the work
has the general effect of stifling societal, cultural and technological growth. More
importantly though, is that the extension of property rights in the creative content
industries has the effect of preventing new content markets from emerging as property
rights are enforced to maintain existing business models and industrial structures.
Industrial growth in the long-run will be restricted by the over-extension of copyright
protection in creative works and that an inclination towards lesser property rights within
the copyright regime will allow the content industries to develop as they experience
changes in their technological environment.
The common pool of available resources that is not within the control of the
copyright owner is also necessary for the general development of culture and society.
Today, the Internet and digital technologies offer consumers of creative works a choice as
to the manner in which creative works are consumed and a general culture of mixing-andmatching bits of works and information appears to be a growing consumer culture over
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the Internet. Indeed, the “most striking power provided by emerging technologies”284 is
“the growing power of consumers to filter what they see.”285 Above that however,
consumers of creative works are likely to be exposed “to a life where one can
individually and collectively participate in making something new,”286 which will build a
culture that creates new works and shares those works with others.287 It is submitted that
the growth of culture and society as a whole stems from the generation of new works of
creative art by consumers of creative works coupled with the sharing and dissemination
of ideas and art with other consumers. The passive reception of creative works by
consumers has built a market for copyrighted works as authors, with the incentives
provided under copyright law, produce “consumable works”288 for consumers to
consume.289 However, the public interest functionality of copyright law to ensure that
there are sufficient materials for the public to use “for the progress of science and the
useful arts” will only be fulfilled when creative works are available to the consumer for
transformative uses as the growth of culture and society as a whole stems from a vibrant
and healthy interchange of creative materials within a public arena.290 The production of
new creative works really depends on the availability of raw materials that may be
rendered inaccessible by excessive protection of copyright owner’s properties. It has been
said that “when copyright has gone wrong in recent times, it has been by taking itself too
seriously, by foolish assumptions about the amount of originality open to man as an
artificer, by sanctimonious pretensions about the iniquities of imitation.”291 If the public
domain operates to provide artists with the resources to inspire new works of creation,292
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the extension of overly broad property rights under the copyright regime will have an
adverse impact on the very act of artistic creation as it would deny “full access to the
stimulus value of the protected creation.”293
The fair use doctrine, it is said, is a “safety valve”294 within copyright law to
ensure that property rights in creative works are not enforced over-extensively to deny
users of creative works the ability to use the works for “criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship or
research.”295 The fair use doctrine operates as a mechanism within copyright law to strike
the delicate balance between an author’s property interest in the copyrighted work and
the public’s interest in being able to access the work. The use of creative content for the
further development of art and literary works is to a very large extent facilitated by the
doctrine, which allows users of content to use the work for the purposes of educational,
societal or cultural growth without seeking prior authorization from the copyright owner.
The fair use doctrine had been said to be a response of the courts to circumstances where
transaction costs for obtaining permission to use the work is too high as a result of market
failure, where “the possibility of consensual bargain has broken down in some way.”296
The advent of the Internet and digital technologies however, may reduce the transaction
costs for obtaining permission to use the work to virtually zero and if this becomes a
reality, then the fair use doctrine, justified as a solution to market failures, will be
rendered obsolete.297 As it is predicted that “fair use will recede as a mechanism for
resolving market failures arising from transaction costs”298 and as copyright owners are
able to impose fees upon users for every use of their works, it is submitted that these
property rights that are given to copyright owners of creative works ought not to be too
extensive as the need for creative materials in the pubic domain increases in order that
the two forms of cognition, which is used as a foundation to elaborate the process of producing a creative
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new creative works may be produced. If new authors and artists are required to pay for
their every single use of creative content as a result of over extensive property rights, then
the very act of producing creative works for the general public will be adversely affected
in the long term. The next portion of this chapter addresses the fair use doctrine and the
effect of its lessening role on the general endeavor of creativity and authorship.
Two principles of copyright law are important in achieving a balance between
uses of creative works by the public and protection of the property rights of the copyright
owner. The notion that creative works must be original to qualify for copyright
protection299 and the protection of original expressions and not mere ideas allow the
courts to draw boundaries as to which works ought to be protected as a matter of law and
which works ought to be within the public domain for general public use. Both the
notions of originality and the idea-expression dichotomy determine the boundaries
between the private and exclusive property rights of authors and artists in their works and
the general public interest of society to obtain access to creative works and whether
particular uses of the work by members of society infringe the rights of the copyright
owner. The law’s rationale for the notion of originality and the idea-expression
dichotomy is that the recognition of exclusive property rights over the work that would
prevent others from having access and making use of it would only be justified if the
author or artist has produced a work of original expression that contributes generally to
society.300 New authors are thereby encouraged by the idea-expression dichotomy to
“convey the ideas and facts expressed in the copyright holder’s work – and for that matter
also to express their own ideas – so long as they do so in words, graphics, or other
expressive components that are not “substantially similar” to those that comprise the
copyright holder’s work.”301
In Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,302 the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit addressed the standard for originality when it had to decide if a
subsequent motion picture infringed copyright in an earlier play when “the similarities
between the two are too specific and detailed to have resulted from chance.”303 Judge
Hand in delivering the opinion of the Court recognized that the broader plot or outline of
a play can never be copyrighted. Nonetheless, Judge Hand felt that in the case before
him, there were significantly dramatic scenes between both the play and the motion
299
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picture that were almost identical and whilst much of the picture may not be attributable
to the play as some parts were drawn from a novel, that did not preclude the Court’s
finding of a copyright infringement of the original play. According to Judge Hand, it was
sufficient to show that substantial parts of the play were taken and included in the
subsequent motion picture in order for the Court to decide that the subsequent work was
an infringement of copyright, for, according to Judge Hand, “no plagiarist can excuse the
wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.”304
Justice Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.305 had, through his
judgment, made it clear that a work need not necessarily have to be a work of fine art in
order to qualify for copyright protection. Chromolithographs that are used to advertise a
circus would qualify for copyright protection despite the fact its “pictorial quality attracts
the crowd and therefore gives them a real use – if use means to increase trade and to help
make money.”306 To Justice Holmes, “a picture is none the less a picture and none the
less a subject of copyright that it is used for an advertisement. And if pictures may be
used to advertise soap, or the theatre, or monthly magazines, as they are, they may be
used to advertise a circus.”307 More importantly however, Justice Holmes felt that the
Court had a very limited role to play in deciding questions of originality because “it
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits.”308 In its essence, Justice Holmes’ judgment affords copyright
protection “for any work exhibiting a human reaction, however simple and whatever the
source of the creator’s inspiration.”309
One of the more difficult aspects of determining the question of originality is
where works from the public domain are used to produce a new work and the courts must
then assess the “quantity and quality of original effort that has gone into producing a
variation of a public domain work.”310 In Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts,
Inc.,311 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had the task of deciding if mezzotint
engraving of paintings that were taken from old masters in the public domain were
eligible for copyright protection. The argument that the engravings could not qualify for
copyright protection because they were reproductions of works in the public domain was
rejected by the Court, which reasoned that while copyright was not available for works
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already in the public domain, translations or other versions of works in the public domain
would be eligible for copyright protection and the mezzotints in this case were such
versions of works in the pubic domain.312 The Court had felt that any variation to works
already in the public domain may be inadvertent but this would not affect the recognition
of copyright in the subsequent work. To the Court, “a copyist’s bad eyesight or defective
musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently
distinguishable variations. Having hit upon such a variation unintentionally, the author
may adopt it as his and copyright it.”313 This approach provides a clear guideline as to
when a work that builds upon works in the public domain may satisfy the originality
requirement and qualify for copyright protection. Where a subsequent work builds upon a
work in a public domain and is a variation of the work, the court will be inclined to
recognize copyright in the subsequent work. The approach rewards an author for the
production of the subsequent work while retaining the original work in the public domain
for the general use of the public.314
The protection of creative expression under copyright law works in tandem with
the requirement for originality to ensure that only the essence of products of authorship
are recognized as being eligible for copyright protection. In this way, the Courts ensure
that the general public is not denied access to the underlying theme and ideas of the work.
The Copyright Act 1976 expressly provides that ideas are ineligible for copyright
protection315 and the Courts have consistently affirmed the freedom of the public to use
ideas of underlying works to produce new and creative works.316 In Baker v. Selden,317 a
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system of ruled lines and headings were used to illustrate a method of book-keeping and
the Supreme Court had grappled with the question of whether copyright existed in the
system of book-keeping via the recognition of copyright in the book itself. While it was
clear to the Court that the book “conveying information on the subject of book-keeping
and containing detailed explanations of the art”318 would be eligible for copyright
protection, it was more evident to the Court that there was “a clear distinction between
the book, as such, and the art which it is intended to illustrate.”319 Novelty in the art
expressed in the book was a matter for patent protection and not copyright, the Court had
felt, and to the Court, “to give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art
described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made,
would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public.”320 Unless a patent was obtained for the
art contained within the book, the public would be able to have access to the ideas
contained in the book. The Court held that copyright existed in the book and the ideas
expressed therein and while the public is enjoined from printing and publishing the book
or any material in it, the system of book-keeping expressed therein was an art that the
public may use and practice.321
The decision of Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., Inc,322 reflected a more definitive approach to the question of originality and
had denied copyright protection to compilations of facts unless the compilation, by their
selection and arrangement, displayed the requisite originality necessary to protect the
compilation under copyright laws. In this case, the Court had to decide if copyright
protection could exist for the publication of a typical telephone directory that consisted of
white pages and yellow pages. The Court held that while there is copyright in the
directory as a whole because it contains some forward text and some original material in
the yellow pages, the white pages were not protected under copyright because it did not
meet the prerequisite of originality required for protection. Rejecting the “sweat of the
brow” theory that copyright was a reward for the hard work that accompanied the
compilation of facts, the Court held that the grant of copyright in factual compilations is
possible in situations where the facts are selected, coordinated and arranged in such a
manner that they satisfied the originality requirement. To the Court, “originality requires
only that the author make the selection or arrangement independently (i.e. without
copying that arrangement or selection from another work), and that it display some
minimal level of creativity.”323 The selection of names, towns and telephone numbers to
fill up the white pages in this case was to the Court, “devoid of even the slightest trace of
creativity” and was therefore unable to qualify for copyright protection. Whilst there was
sufficient effort exerted to render the white pages directory useful, the Court felt that
there was insufficient creativity expressed to make the directory original. The Court went
on to make it clear that “copyright rewards originality, not effort.”324
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It is submitted that the notion of originality and the idea-expression dichotomy
will arise more frequently before the Courts in disputes pertaining to copyright law as
users are now exposed to the many different ways of using copyrighted content as well as
works from the public domain to generate new and creative works of their own. As new
authors as well as private home users of copyrighted content, made available over the
Internet by authors themselves, become increasingly aware of the ability of the Internet
and digital technologies to make modifications and alterations to existing works as well
as compile and gather pieces of separate works to form a composite whole, the law will
be required to address the extent to which an author’s property rights end and the public’s
interests begin when new authors and users begin exploring these new ways of creative
expression. If author’s rights are extended to every segment of the market where
consumers derive value and the fair use doctrine is rendered obsolete as the Internet
lowers transaction costs to a bare minimum, then there is a reason to delineate the
boundaries of private property clearly as users of creative works become increasingly
able to produce and create works of their own from existing works. Websites, for
example, may comprise compilations of different pieces of works that are digitally put
together325 and “image, text, movie, and sound files are much easier to alter, transform,
and incorporate into other works.”326 As an increasing amount of creative works are
generated by new authors and ordinary users through the technologies and capabilities of
the Internet, copyright law’s principle that a work must be an original expression of
authorship to qualify for protection will become a bedrock guide to deciding the limits of
copyright protection in existing works and in recognizing property rights in new works.
As digital technologies introduce fundamental changes to content industries and
as copyright law struggles to keep up with the changing technological environment to
extend rights where necessary and to ensure that the public has sufficient access to
materials upon which new materials may be produced, it has been suggested that
copyright law be recast as a right to commercial exploitation.327 A commercial
exploitation right328 may present a solution to the challenges faced by copyright law in
accommodating technological change through its various doctrines and principles in the
digital age and would allow authors to extend rights into every corner where commercial
value from creative works may be derived. It is suggested that the commercial
exploitation right may be introduced to replace the copyright regime, where the
reproduction right is central to any question of infringement.329 It is however argued that
325
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today, the “making of digital reproductions is an unavoidable incident of reading,
viewing, listening to, learning from, sharing, improving, and reusing works embodied in
digital media.”330 As the making of copies is unavoidable for uses of digital works,
“reproduction is no longer an appropriate way to measure infringement”331 because of the
“the centrality of copying to use of digital technology.”332 If the reproduction right,
which is “the fundamental copyright right”333 is no longer an appropriate benchmark to
determine questions of infringement, it is suggested that a commercial exploitation right
be introduced in its place because the public already understands that “making money
using other people’s works is copyright infringement, while non commercial uses are all
okay.”334
Replacing the reproduction right with the commercial exploitation right may
therefore mold the law more closely to popular expectations and would ease enforcement
efforts and make the mass education of the public more appealing.335 It has also been
suggested that the “affirmative right should include a limited privilege to circumvent any
technological access controls”336 to “gain access to, extract, use, and reuse the ideas,
facts, information, and other public domain material embodied in protected works.”337
The commercial exploitation right should also provide “a privilege to reproduce, adapt,
transmit, perform, or display so much of the protected expression as is required in order
to gain access to the unprotected elements”338 so as to make “the public’s right to the
public domain explicit.”339 The notion that copyright law is intended to protect creative
authorship to provide authors with the necessary incentives to create works for the
general public is a very noble one. However, it cannot be denied that copyright law is
really about the commercialization of creative content in a vibrant market place. At the
end of the day, the more fundamental purpose of the law is to balance the tension
between private property rights and public interest to ensure that the ultimate aim of the
constitutional clause is met and that society as a whole benefits from the creative efforts
of authors. A commercial exploitation right may serve this purpose.
Setting limitations upon the private property rights of copyright owners may also
provide the public with greater access to creative works. These limitations upon private
property rights may take several forms. Law makers may set limitations upon the
duration for copyright protection by introducing a limited term of protection for the
exclusive rights provided under the law. At present, the copyright protection term is for a
period that extends from the creation of the work for the life time of the author plus
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seventy years340 after the author’s death.341 Limiting the term of copyright protection to
provide the public with access to the work within a shorter period requires Congress to
consider various important policy questions. The limitations upon the duration for
copyright protection imposed by the Statute of Anne 1710, for example, were premised
on Parliament’s policy to break up the monopoly that the English booksellers had over
the book trade. Imposing a limitation upon present copyright protection may be premised
on a public welfare policy to provide greater public access to creative works for
transformative and developmental uses.342 It is however, important to note that the Berne
Convention for the protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act 1971) sets a
minimum standard for copyright protection.343 Under Article 7(1), the minimum term of
protection is the life of the author and fifty years after his or her death.
Limitations may also be imposed on the property rights of copyright owners
through the requirement that the copyright owner satisfies certain formalities to entitle
him or her to copyright protection in creative works. The decision of the Supreme Court
in Wheaton v. Peters344 made it clear that copyright was a statutory creation in the United
States and an author seeking copyright protection will have to comply with the
formalities imposed by the Copyright Act.345 Upon adherence to the Berne Convention
however, formalities compliance in the United States has ceased to be a prerequisite for
copyright protection.346 Although formalities are no longer a prerequisite to copyright
protection, the imposition of certain formal requirements may provide a limitation to the
property rights of copyright owners so that the public may have increased access to
creative works. A short term for copyright protection with an option for renewal may
provide the balance that the law seeks to achieve between private and public interests.
The Statute of Anne 1710, for example, provided authors with two successive copyright
protection terms of 14 years each, with the requirement that the author renews the
copyright in the work after the first 14 years lapses. The implementation of such a
provision today however, will be prohibited by Article 7 (1) of the Berne Convention,

340

The Copyright Term Extension Act increased the duration of copyright protection from life of the author
plus fifty years to life of the author plus seventy years. Pub. L. No. 105-298.
341
17 U.S.C. § 302 (a) (2001)
342
Providing greater public access to creative works decentralizes power within the creative content
industries. It has been argued that an overly extensive copyright duration will centralize power within the
copyright industries at the expense of authors, the main beneficiaries of copyright protection under the law.
Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 655, 659 (1996)
343
The United States adhered to the Berne Convention on March 1, 1989 and the Copyright Act 1976 was
amended to give effect to the provisions of the Convention. WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE 453 (The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1994)
344
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834)
345
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works expressly stipulates in Article
5(2) that “[t]he enjoyment and the exercise of [copyrights] shall not be subject to any formality” and until
the United States adhered to the Berne Convention on March 1, 1989, authors seeking copyright protection
for their works were subject to the strict requirement that they comply with the formalities under the law.
WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 404 (The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1994)
346
Compliance with statutory formalities however, is a prerequisite to certain remedies under the law. For
example, under 17 U.S.C. § 412, copyright registration is required for an award of statutory damages and
attorney fees. See id. at 405

54

which mandates that the minimum term for copyright protection is for the life of the
author plus fifty years after his or her death.
The law may also provide for greater public access to works by introducing a
compulsory licensing scheme into the present copyright regime. Subjecting creative
content to compulsory licensing would allow the public to use the work with the payment
of a fixed statutory royalty. Non dramatic musical works are presently subject to
compulsory licensing under § 115 of the Copyright Act 1976 and any person, who wishes
to obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute phonorecords is required to serve a
notice of that intention to the copyright owner.347 A compulsory licensing scheme such as
that under § 115 will provide the public with access to creative works348 and allow
copyright owners to receive fair compensation for public uses of their works.349 The
determination of reasonable royalty rates for the public’s uses of creative works may be
set by copyright arbitration royalty panels that are appointed and convened by the
Librarian of Congress under § 801. A compulsory licensing regime will to a large extent
remove many of the present restrictions that copyright owners impose upon uses of their
works and ensure that the public is able to use these works for transformative,
developmental and creative purposes. Compulsory licenses have been said to be
“antithesis of the [copyright owner’s] exclusive rights”350 and it is important to note that
the Berne Convention restricts the application of compulsory licenses in several ways.351
The final limitation upon the right of the copyright owner to ensure that the public
may make use of creative works recognizes that certain derivative uses of content may be
allowed under the fair use doctrine. The production of parodies, for example, will be
allowed as a fair use of a work, especially where the parody is transformative of the
original work and confers a benefit upon society. The Supreme Court in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,352 for example, was of the opinion that parodies, like “less
ostensibly humorous forms of criticism,” may provide social benefit by “shedding light
on an earlier work, and, in that process, creating a new one.”353 To the Court, “there is no
protectible derivative market for criticism”354 in which copyright owners may assert
property rights. By recognizing that certain derivative works are criticisms or parodies of
347
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original works and that copyright owners are not likely to “license at any price, derivative
works that criticize their original creation,”355 law makers may set limits upon the rights
provided under § 106 of the Copyright Act 1976.
These limitations upon private property rights ensure that the public is able to
gain access to creative works for uses that facilitate the growth and development of
society, education and culture. By restricting private property rights, the law may allow
the growth of a richer and more diverse public domain from which the public may draw
upon to develop, create and produce new forms of art, knowledge and creative works. It
has been said that “creativity is impossible without a rich public domain” and that
“[n]othing today, likely nothing since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: [c]ulture, like
science and technology grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of
those who came before.”356 Copyright was historically statutorily codified to ensure that
creative works were not made inaccessible through the control that the English
booksellers had over the book trade and that the public had access to these works so that
learning could take place within society. Education, cultural development and societal
growth today require the same accessibility to creative works. Providing the public with
access to creative works will allow general growth and development to occur within
society. The delicate balance between private rights of creative content providers and
public interest in access to creative content can only be attained through copyright law.

Part 4: The Fair Use Doctrine
The fair use doctrine was originally developed by the judiciary in the lateeighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries as the English law and equity courts construed
the Statute of Anne 1710.357 The courts in the United States adopted the fair use defense
in 1839358 and it remained a doctrine of the judiciary until it was statutorily codified in
1978 in the Copyright Act.359 It has been said that “the doctrine of fair use, originally
created and articulated in case law, permits courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is
designed to foster.”360 The judiciary has not found the application of the doctrine to be an
easy one and has referred to it as the “most troublesome in the whole law of
copyright,”361 noting that the “doctrine is entirely equitable and is so flexible as virtually
to defy definition.”362 Section 107 of the Copyright Act offers some guidelines to assist
the courts in determining the issues of fair use and the courts have regarded the four
statutory factors under section 107 as being equally important in the court’s analysis of
355
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fair use, “notwithstanding the oft-quoted assertion of the paramount importance of the
fourth factor.”363 Each case before the courts on the fair use doctrine is decided on a caseby-case basis and this “task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules.”364
The first consideration under section 107 requires an analysis of “the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes.”365 As subsequent authors build upon works of previous
authors, the nature of the use of the work by a subsequent author becomes important in
deciding whether the use of the work is a fair use. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc.,366 the Supreme Court stated that when a new work “adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning or
message,” the court ought to ask “whether and to what extent the new work is
“transformative.””367 The Supreme Court felt that “although such transformative use is
not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright to promote science
and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works
thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the
confines of copyright and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair
use.”368 The point that a subsequent use of a creative work will be more likely to be
regarded as a fair use if the work is transformative of the first is further made in Castle
Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc.,369 where the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit stated that “if the secondary use adds value to the original – if
copyrightable expression in the original work is used as raw material, transformed in the
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings – this is the
very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of
society. In short, the goal of copyright to promote science and the arts is generally
furthered by the creation of transformative works.”370 The finding that the use of a
subsequent work is fair use is also dependent on whether the use of the subsequent work
is for commercial purposes. Using a subsequent work for commercial purposes creates a
presumption against the finding of a fair use,371 although the presumption may be
rebutted, such as when commercial uses of the work is minimal or when the public
benefits from the subsequent work. In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,372 for
example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that the courts were “free to
consider the public benefit resulting from a particular use notwithstanding the fact that
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the alleged infringer may gain commercially”373 and decided that the disassembly of a
copyrighted computer program to gain access to the ideas and functional elements
embodied in it was “a fair use of the copyrighted work as a matter of law.”374 The
defendant’s reliance on the fair use doctrine must also be equitable and where the
defendant’s use of the work is for profit-makingand where the defendant’s use of the
work usurps a significant portion of the copyright holder’s market, the application of the
fair use doctrine will be precluded, even though the subsequent work contains materials
of possible public importance.375
The second consideration for the courts in a fair use analysis under section 107 is
the “nature of the copyrighted work.”376 Under this consideration, the courts would
consider a highly creative work to have more protection from unauthorized copying and
would subject more informational and functional works to the doctrine of fair use. The
Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,377 mentioned that “this factor calls
for the recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection
than others, with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the
former works are copied”378 and provided examples in cases where different types of
works were contrasted to illustrate the point. In Stewart v. Abend,379 the Supreme Court
regarded that “in general, fair use is more likely to be found in factual works than in
fictional works.”380 The Supreme Court in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises381 thought that the fair use doctrine had a narrower application for
unpublished materials as it explained that “while even substantial quotations might
qualify as fair use in a review of a published work or a news account of a speech that had
been delivered to the public or disseminated to the press, the author’s right to control the
first public appearance of his expression weighs against such use of the work before its
release.”382 The Supreme Court had also thought that the copying of a news broadcast
373

The Court goes on to state that “[p]ublic benefit may not be direct or tangible, but may arise because the
challenged use serves a public interest. In the case before us, Accolade’s identification of the functional
requirements for Genesis compatibility has led to an increase in the number of independently designed
video games programs offered for use with the Genesis console. It is precisely this growth in creative
expression, based on the dissemination of other creative works and the unprotected ideas contained in those
works that the Copyright Act was intended to promote. The fact that Genesis compatible video games are
not scholarly works, but works offered for sale on the market, does not alter our judgment in this regard.
We conclude that given the purpose and character of Accolade’s use of Sega’s video game programs, the
presumption of unfairness has been overcome and the first statutory factor weighs in favor of Accolade.”
977 F.2d at 1523
374
977 F.2d at 1527-1528
375
In Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 621
F.2d 57 (1980), for example, the defendants copied and broadcasted portions of a student produced film
without the authorization of the copyright holder. The broadcast of the copyrighted work without the
authorization of the copyright holder was held to be a usurpation of the copyright owner’s rights to exploit
that commercial market and did not justify the application of the fair use doctrine on equitable grounds.
376
17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2001)
377
510 U.S. 569 (1994)
378
510 U.S. at 586
379
495 U.S. 207 (1990)
380
495 U.S. at 237
381
471 U.S. 539 (1985)
382
471 U.S. at 564

58

may have a stronger claim for fair use than the copying of a motion picture, as was stated
in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios.383
The third consideration for the courts in an analysis of the fair use doctrine is “the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole.”384 This inquiry extends beyond the examination of the subsequent work as being
quantitatively substantial to the original work to whether the use of the subsequent work
of the first is qualitatively substantial. In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises,385 the Supreme Court thought that the subsequent work had only quoted an
insubstantial portion of the original work. Nonetheless, the insubstantial portion that was
taken was “essentially the heart”386 of the original work as well as the “most interesting
and moving parts of the entire manuscript”387 and would thereby weigh against the
finding of fair use. The Court also felt that “a taking may not be excused merely because
it is insubstantial with respect to the infringing work”388 and “conversely, the fact that a
substantial portion of the infringing work was copied verbatim is evidence of the
qualitative value of the copied material, both to the originator and to the plagiarist who
seeks to profit from marketing someone else’s copyrighted expression.”389
The fourth consideration for the courts in the fair use analysis is “the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”390 In MCA, Inc. v.
Wilson,391 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained the fourth fair use factor
by stating that “where a claim of fair use is made, a balance must sometimes be struck
between the benefit the public will derive if the use is permitted and the personal gain the
copyright owner will receive if the use is denied. The less adverse effect that an alleged
infringing use has on the copyright owner’s expectation of gain, the less public benefit
needs to be shown to justify the use.”392 The Supreme Court in Sony Corporation of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.393 addressed this factor by stating that a
subsequent use of a copyright owner’s work should not deprive the copyright owner of
the incentives that Congress intended the copyright owner to have by the provision of
rights that may be exploited in a commercial market. According to the Supreme Court,
“the purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort. Even copying for non
commercial purposes may impair the copyright holder’s ability to obtain the rewards that
Congress intended him to have. But a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the
potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order
to protect the incentive to create. The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would
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merely inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing benefit.”394 In considering the
potential market in which a copyright owner is entitled to exploit the work, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Salinger v. Random House, Inc.395 thought that the
potential market was the mere opportunity opened to the copyright owner to sell the
copyrighted work396 and in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,397 the
Supreme Court stated that this analysis should take into account not only the harm to the
market for the original work but also harm to the market for any derivative works.398
The fair use doctrine is said to have been employed to “permit uncompensated
transfers that are socially desirable but not capable of effectuation through the market.”399
This view is based on the market system that is regarded as a system where consensual
exchanges of goods take place. Where markets do not function effectively to allocate
resources between individuals in the market, such as when “the markets fail to generate
economically desirable outcomes”400 or “when using the market process would threaten
other social goals,”401 other modes of resource control will be employed by the legal,
economic or social system to reallocate resources. The fair use doctrine is said to be the
“judicial response to market failure in the copyright context”402 and serves to allocate
resources in copyrighted content between the copyright owner and users who desire
accessibility to the work, where the circumstances of the market place make it impossible
for users to obtain authorization from copyright owners for the use the work. Three
conditions must be satisfied in order that perfect competition may exist within a market
place to ensure that individual market transactions result in a maximization of value.403
394
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The first is that all costs and benefits to the transactions that generate them must be
internal,404 the second is that there must be perfect knowledge405 and the third is that there
must be an absence of transaction costs.406 These three conditions must be present in
order that it may be appropriate to rely on consensual bargains to achieve socially
desirable results. The law of copyright facilitates the functioning of the consensual
market by creating property rights, lowering transaction costs, providing valuable
information and containing mechanisms for the enforcement of rights.407 In most cases,
users of copyrighted content would proceed through the market and obtain the copyright
owner’s authorization for the use of the work although at times, copyright markets will
not always function adequately, such as when “bargaining may be exceedingly
expensive, or it may be impractical to obtain enforcement against non purchasers, or
other market flaws might preclude achievement of desirable consensual exchanges”408
and in these cases, the market has failed and is not able to mediate between the public
interest to have access to the work and the copyright owner’s interest to receive
compensation for the use of the work. Where the market has failed, the courts apply the
fair use doctrine “when they approve a user’s departure from the market.”409
New technologies are said to pose a market barrier that prevents users of
copyrighted content from obtaining authorization for the use of the content from the
copyright owner. This is because high transaction costs are involved with seeking
authorization to use the work as a new technology would not have established the
necessary market channels upon which users may rely to obtain authorization from
copyright owners, which would make the “purchase of permission”410 from copyright
owners “cumbersome and expensive.”411 The correspondingly low anticipated profits
from use of the work would also discourage users from seeking authorization from the
copyright owner because of the high transaction costs involved.
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The introduction of a new technology into the market impacts existing business
structures within the copyright industries to a very large extent because users have new
ways to gain access to copyrighted content. Music file sharing technology and online
distribution of music content, for example, have brought profound changes to the sound
recording industry. The very existing business model and industrial structure of the sound
recording industry are threatened as artists have direct contact with their listeners and the
industry faces loss of jobs as their role as the intermediary between recording artists and
music listeners lessen with online music distribution.412 With as many as 2.6 billion
music files being downloaded and shared without authorization each month and as many
as approximately 600,000 movies being downloaded from the Internet without
authorization daily through out the world,413 the Internet has certainly offered users of
copyrighted content unprecedented access to files containing sound recordings and
motion pictures that were unavailable to users before. The fair use doctrine was raised as
an affirmative defense for the unauthorized uses of music files over peer-to-peer
networks on the file-sharing technology in the Napster case in three specific instances,
which were sampling, where users make temporary copies of a work before deciding to
purchase it, space-shifting, where users are allowed to access a sound recording through
the Napster system that they already own in audio CD format and the permissive
distribution of sound recordings by new and established artists.414 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court for N.D. of California’s decision that the
use of sound recordings files over the Napster technology was not a fair use for several
reasons under Section 107.415 According to the Court of Appeals, the use of the sound
recording files over the network was non transformative and was of a commercial
nature;416 the “musical compositions and sound recordings are creative in nature …
which cuts against a finding of fair use under the second factor;”417 that “Napster users
engage in “wholesale copying” of copyrighted work because file transfer necessarily
“involves copying the entirety of the copyrighted work;””418 and that the District Court’s
finding that the downloading of music files from the Internet harms the market of the
copyright owner by reducing CD sales amongst college students and raises barriers to the
copyright owner’s entry into the market for the digital downloading of music was a
“correct application of the fair use doctrine.”419
Arguably, the Court could have also proceeded to analyze the fair use doctrine in
the Napster case using the market failure theory. The first part of the test to determine if
412
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the fair use doctrine will apply in any given case of copyright infringement is whether
there is a market failure, where the possibility of consensual bargain between the
copyright owner and the user becomes impossible.420 In the Napster case, it would appear
that the market for digital download of music was fully functional because the copyright
owner had already entered the digital music download market or had planned to enter the
market within a relatively short period.421 The presence of the copyright owner within the
market would allow consensual bargains to take place between the copyright owner and
the user for the download of music, which would prevent the application of the fair use
doctrine in the Napster case. Even if there was a market failure, the availability of music
files over the Internet for downloading for $0.99 a song over the present Napster
downloading service422 would indicate that the price that the copyright owner is asking
for the digital download of a music file is small and hence lower than what the user
would offer. This being the case, social value is increased wherever there is a voluntary
transaction between the copyright owner and the user.423 The third element of the market
failure test concerns the economic welfare of the copyright owner and where the
copyright owner would suffer no harm or disincentive by allowing users free use of the
work, the fair use doctrine ought to apply to allow users to use the copyrighted work.424
In the Napster case, the copyright owner would inevitably suffer harm or disincentive
from entering the digital download market if the uses of music files over the Napster
network were regarded to be a fair use. Indeed, the District Court in Napster conceded
that the “defendant has contributed to a new attitude that digitally-downloaded songs
ought to be free – an attitude that creates formidable hurdles for the establishment of a
commercial downloading market.”425 Using the market failure analysis, therefore the
Court would have arrived at the same conclusion that the use of the music files over the
Napster network was not a fair use.
Indeed, with the far-reaching effects of the Internet and the connectivity authors
and artists have with users of their works because of digital technologies that facilitate the
distribution and dissemination of copyrighted works, the question of how relevant the fair
use doctrine is today becomes an important one. If the doctrine is a response to market
failure where it is impossible for the copyright owner and the user to reach a consensual
bargain for the transfer of the copyrighted work, the Internet and digital technologies will
render the doctrine virtually inapplicable in today’s copyright markets because digital
rights management that sets systems of fee collection and revenue distribution will allow
consensual bargains to take place between copyright owners and users for the use of the
work.426 Where consensual bargains between copyright owner and users become possible
420
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through on-line facilities over the Internet, users of copyrighted works will have to seek
authorization from copyright owners for the use of the work and “consumers can be
expected to pay for what previously they copied free.”427 This being the case, in the
Internet age, copyright law would have extended into “every corner where consumers
derive value from literary and artistic works”428 and copyright owners can be ensured of
the protection of their incentives under copyright law as works become increasingly
available through the Internet and as users will no longer be able to justify an
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work based on the impossibility of reaching a
consensual bargain with the copyright owner.
As copyright protection of works of authorship grows, there will be inevitable
concerns about the extent to which copyright protection ought to reach into the public’s
interests in accessing the work, especially by second authors seeking to borrow from the
original work to produce new materials. The use of copyrighted content for
transformative purposes lies at the heart of present debates between proponents for
stronger copyright protection and their opponents, who argue that the expansion of rights
has the effect of stifling transformative uses of copyrighted works “that parallels, but is
far more systematic than the problem of private censorship.”429 It has been said that “to
the extent that copyright in an author’s potential source material requires payment for the
quotation, reformulation, adaptation, or parody of that material, some such transformative
uses will never transpire”430 and it is indeed difficult to disagree with the probability that
general cultural, societal and technological growth as a whole will be adversely affected
by the enforcement of rights that are too extensive.431 The moderation of copyright
protection is a sensible stance to take in light of the extensive enforcement efforts that the
sound recording industry has undertaken against users who download music files from
the Internet. Although it is given that copyright owners have entitlements and property
rights in their works to provide them with the necessary incentives to produce new works,
it is indeed true that the production of creative works that copyright law seeks to foster by
the provision of incentives ought not to be an end in itself because “publication without
easy access to the product would defeat the social purpose of copyright already
mentioned as primary.”432
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With authors becoming increasingly empowered to distribute and disseminate
their works independently over the Internet and with digital technologies, the call for
greater copyright protection of creative works will very likely shift from intermediaries,
such as sound recording companies and motion pictures studios to authors or creative
artists. The assertion and enforcement of greater property rights will most likely come
from authors and artists and it will be difficult for law and policy makers to ignore the
call for more extensive rights as an incentive to create from the creators of creative works
themselves. As the role of the publisher or intermediary in bringing a copyrighted work
to the public changes and authors and artists take a more central role in marketing,
distributing and disseminating their works, a proliferation of “unedited
communications”433 such as “poetic musings, home movies and basement band
recordings”434 will spawn over the Internet to provide new and original materials that the
public may have access to. This is particularly so within the sound recording industry as
independent recording artists make their works available over the Internet to their
listeners. It is submitted that as an increasing number of independent artists and authors
begin to make their works available to the public through the Internet, users will begin to
use these works in ways that may not be anticipated nor authorized by the artist or author.
The principles within copyright law will be instrumental in achieving a fair balance
between protecting artists and authors as well as allowing users to use the work for
personal or transformative purposes.
Conclusion
This paper had attempted to shed some light on the present copyright debates that
surround the advent of the Internet and the effect that these new technologies have on the
flow of information within the creative content industries. Sound recordings are
particularly susceptible to the mass reproduction and distribution that Internet
technologies facilitate, simply because there is a wide consumer market for these creative
products. Content owners have sought to retain control of their creative materials as
consumers use these works in ways that were not envisaged let alone authorized by
copyright owners. The Internet and digital technologies have caused fundamental
changes to the way content industries had traditionally been able to commercialize their
works and as these technologies provide consumers unprecedented access to creative
materials, many of the industries’ existing business models and industrial structures have
undergone some basic changes. The sound recording industry’s conventional distribution
channels for music, for example, have changed drastically as independent music artists
explore new ways to establish direct contact with listeners of their music without going
through a sound recording company. The opportunities that the Internet present
independent music artists strike at the heart of the sound recording industry and music
artist relationships that had been at the core of the sound recording industry for decades.
Indeed, the opportunities that the Internet brings with it are exciting. Authors and
artists being able to establish direct relationships with their audiences and the ability of
the Internet to connect millions of content users provide an environment in which culture
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may thrive and grow through the mutual exchange of creative thoughts and ideas.
Nonetheless, with all the excitement that it brings, the Internet does pose a serious
challenge to the content industries that have so far relied on copyright protection to
commercialize their works. The grant of property rights in creative works through
copyright law has served a utilitarian purpose up to this time, for authors have been
encouraged to produce creative works for the public with the expectation that the
successful commercialization of the work will reap rewards that will make their effort in
producing the work worthwhile. The Internet and digital technologies however, have
altered this expectation and authors or artists, who are unable to foresee some form of
reward for their efforts in producing creative works, expecting these works to be rapidly
reproduced and disseminated to the public without being able to recover their cost of
production for the work, may cease the production of creative works at the general
public’s expense.
While the Internet and digital technologies may have introduced fundamental
changes to the industries’ business models and industrial structures, the industries’
responses to the opportunities presented by the Internet and digital technologies largely
determine whether content may be successfully commercialized through the Internet
today. This paper submits that the industries’ call for more extensive rights under the
copyright regime may have a detrimental effect on the development and growth of the
industries as the assertion of greater control over information flow in copyrighted works
keeps the industries functioning within the exiting business models and industrial
structures that have worked well for the industries thus far. The call for more extensive
copyright laws effectively prevents the industries from exploring other new ways of
commercializing content and has the long term effect of stifling industrial growth and
development. Preventing the use of the VCR by home users as an infringement of
copyright law, for example, would have prevented the growth of a home video market for
the motion pictures industry. The development of new business models for
commercializing motion pictures and sound recordings over the Internet ensures that the
industries continue to grow and develop in tandem with the introduction of technologies
into the market place.
The successful commercialization of motion pictures and sound recordings
through the Internet today ultimately depends on the industries’ responses to the
expectations of the consumer of their works. With the Internet presenting consumers of
creative works opportunities to use these works in new and unprecedented ways, such as
sharing the work with others through peer-to-peer networks or modifying the work for
transformative purposes using digital technologies, the role of the content industries will
evolve from being content providers to being service providers to consumers, who access
creative materials through the Internet. As consumers are more actively involved in
choosing the manner in which they use content today, content providers are also more
likely to be able to successfully segregate their markets to meet these different needs and
expectations of the consumer. Through industrial practices, such as price discrimination,
the industries may commercialize their content in accordance to the different expectations
and needs of their consumers and generate revenues to reap the rewards of their creative
efforts through the segregation of different consumer markets over the Internet. The
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commercialization of creative works over the Internet also allows the industries to
develop a market for a particular genre of content that more conventional publishing and
distribution channels do not carry. Independent music that represents a mix of different
styles of musical expression, for example, may not be carried by record labels but may
successfully find its place among independent music lovers over the Internet.
The technological change brought about by the Internet and digital media
technologies has also caused a fundamental shift in the industrial structure of the content
industries as artists and authors find their own place in the commercialization of content
through the Internet. Online exhibition of independent motion pictures is a real possibility
today and independent music artists have started to distribute music through the Internet
without a sound recording company to provide the support that it traditionally provided
sound recording artists. Authors and artists are finding new ways to market and distribute
their content through the Internet and traditional intermediaries, such as motion picture
studios and sound recording companies, which had played a central role within the
industries commercialization of creative works in bringing these works to the consumer,
have a lesser role in providing the channel between content production and content
distribution. As more authors and artists make their works available through the Internet,
users will have greater access to creative works for transformative and creative uses. It is
likely that there will be persistent calls for stronger copyright protection although it will
be authors and artists, rather than the industries, who will seek greater copyright
protection. As content users use works for transformative purposes, especially with
digital technologies that make modifications and alterations of existing works as simple
as a few clicks of a button on a computer, there will very likely be calls for moral rights
protection to protect the integrity of authors and their works of authorship. While the
United States have yet to recognize moral rights as that recognized in civil law countries,
such as France and Germany, American law makers may be faced with calls for the
recognition of moral rights of authors to protect their integrity as their works of
authorship are being modified and altered over the Internet.
The issue at the heart of the debates that surround copyright law in the digital age
is really the extent of private rights against the public domain, for while property rights in
creative works ensure that copyright owners have the exclusive rights in the work for its
successful commercialization, these rights also entitle copyright owners to deny the
public uses of the work. Claims to exclusivity of content by copyright owners in an age
where information and creative works flow freely through the Internet have caused public
interest groups, defending the rights of the public to creative content for general societal
and cultural growth, to arise. There have been movements to limit property rights of
content owners to ensure that creative works fall within the public domain, such as the
constitutional challenge made to the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act’s extension of
the period of copyright protection for new and existing works by twenty years in Eldred
v. Ashcroft.435 These movements have brought an increased awareness of the need for
copyright law to address the balance between property rights and public interests that the
Internet has indeed affected in a profound manner. Technologies such as file sharing
software and peer-to-peer networks, allowing the easy transfer of content between users
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over the Internet, have allowed content users to participate fully in the distribution of
content to the general public, shifting the onus of content distribution from content
owners to users. As the cost of reproduction of content approaches near zero, users of
content will inevitably begin to invest in reproduction, modification and alteration of
content, heightening the urgency for greater and stronger copyright protection for content
owners. The call for greater copyright protection by the industries however, expands the
law into aspects of commerce that the law was neither intended nor drafted to address.
Changing industrial trends brought about by new technologies ought to be addressed
through new industrial and business practices. While the law may provide a comforting
solution to the changes brought about the Internet through the protection of existing
business models and industrial practices, the law is not equipped to provide the industries
with a panacea for the fundamental changes that a technology as permeating as the
Internet has introduced to the content market place.
Copyright law was formally enacted in 1710 in the Statute of Anne to serve a
noble purpose, which was to encourage learning by providing a temporary property right
in creative works to the author so that authors may be encouraged to produce creative
works for the public. The United States Constitution echoes the same purpose for
copyright protection, which is to grant authors an exclusive right in their works for the
ultimate intention of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts. Copyright
owners have sought to extend these rights as and when technological change occurs and
the law has stretched itself to cover new uses of works through new technologies until the
advent of the Internet and accompanying digital technologies, when it has slowly become
apparent that the role of the law in addressing changing industrial and business trends is a
limited one. Indeed, the law may recognize a property right in creative works to provide
authors with incentives to produce new works. It is however, erroneous to build industrial
practices and business models upon a law that developed as a result of a new technology
and which is uniquely entwined with technological development throughout its history.
Technological development will always have an impact on copyright law and the subject
matter of its protection, creative works, causing a shift in the balance that the law has
always sought to draw between private rights and public interest. As the Internet causes
fundamental changes within the industries, the law’s response to these changes would be
to identify a new balance between private property rights and the rights of the public to
access these works. The law is perfectly poised at this point to identify a fair balance to
ensure that creative works are made accessible to the public by the grant of a limited
property right in the work.
At the end of the day, the most important question that copyright law may provide
an answer to is whether the public as a whole will develop and grow through the grant of
temporary property rights to authors in creative works. As use of the Internet grows, the
central role for copyright law would be to ensure that a market for copyrighted materials
exists through the grant of property rights to authors to enable them to commercialize
their works. The law bears a responsibility to recognize that a thriving content market is
built upon the ability of consumers to use creative works for the purposes they were
intended for, which is learning, development, education and cultural growth. The
enforcement of strict property rights will defeat the very purpose of generating creative
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works. There is a need for the law to achieve a balance between private rights of the
authors and the public interest by setting a clear demarcation as to where private rights
ought to end and where public rights to access begin. Upon achieving this balance,
copyright law today may then be said to have fulfilled the historical and constitutional
purpose for which it was enacted.
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